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CONTEMPORARY MARINE CORPS  
LEADERSHIP ISSUES II:  
2nd MARINE DIVISION, FMF

Thomas D. Affourtit

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U.S. Department of the Navy  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Code: MPH)  
Washington, D.C. 20380

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19. (continued)

Rank Disparity  
Racial/Ethnic Disparity  
Management Objectives

Performance Validity  
Leadership Perceptions  
Career Planning

20. (continued)

The results are presented according to several principal areas of interest, viz., total command, senior-subordinate interaction, intergroup relations, career planning, and performance and validity measures.

In addition to the standard scale scores produced by the motivational assessment technique (Interaction Inventory), a unit Disparity Index was developed as a measure of disunity or disagreement between senior and subordinate members and racial/ethnic groups of a command.

The predictive validity of the Interaction Inventory was established using unauthorized absenteeism and first term reenlistment rates as criteria. Scale scores and disparity measures were significant predictors of performance on seven of the eight scales applied.

A strong foundation for acceptance and implementation of the LEAP has been established through field testing, data analyses, and application of standard validation procedures. The results contained in this report indicate that the LEAP is a viable organizational development method which may have a significant impact on the future management of personnel in the Marine Corps.

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CONTEMPORARY MARINE CORPS  
LEADERSHIP ISSUES II:  
2nd MARINE DIVISION, FMF -

Thomas D. Affourtit

Prepared for:  
Department of the Navy  
Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps (Code: MPH)  
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Thirteen company and battery commands from the 2nd Marine Division, FMF participated in a study to determine the operational feasibility of the Leadership Evaluation and Analysis Program (LEAP). The LEAP is a decentralized, self-applied organizational development program designed for the small unit leader. Unit commanders are provided the techniques and procedure by which they may assess leadership concerns, measure the level of unit combat readiness, and evaluate the effectiveness of the decision-making process in terms of both motivational and performance criteria. Decision-making feedback, through periodic application of the LEAP, aids the leader in developing the flexibility necessary to control and influence different groups under a variety of conditions and mission requirements.

Based on the comments by participant commanders regarding the applicability, comprehensibility, and acceptability of the program, the LEAP was considered operationally feasible. Details of the field test and comments by commanders are given in a separate report (Affourtit, 1977).

While the primary mission of the LEAP is to provide unit commanders with a valid information-gathering process, the secondary goal of the program involves the accumulation of results in a collective effort to seek common solutions to common leadership problems, while maintaining the confidentiality of individual units.

The purpose of this report is to analyze and interpret the combined results obtained during the field study. This information can be used by commanders as a guide to facilitate unit analyses and to help establish unit standards and objectives. These results may also be employed by higher command to formulate policy which is beyond the control of the small unit leader, but which has a direct effect on unit combat readiness.

The results of this study are presented according to the following principal areas of interest:

### Total Command Analysis

- Overall motivation for the Division increased significantly since the July 1975 survey. The most striking improvement occurred in the areas of command efficiency and cohesion. Concerning the equality indicators, the largest improvements were found with conditions of justice and intergroup climate. Changes in perceptions of minority and majority discrimination were not significant.

- Item analysis results lend support to a distinction which can be made between combat readiness using traditional standards (training goals accomplished), and combat effectiveness in terms of the desire of troops to function as a cohesive unit, with confidence in the hierarchy of command, and dedication to their mission. While Marines rated training level and encouragement from leaders highest of all preparedness conditions, job satisfaction, morale and spirit, confidence in leadership, and respect between unit members were judged among the lowest conditions.
- Measures of command cohesion were directly related to unit unauthorized absenteeism (UA) and first term reenlistment rates. As perceptions of cohesion increased, individual unit UA rates significantly decreased and reenlistment rates significantly increased.

#### Senior-Subordinate Interaction

- Rank analysis reveals that NCO's tend to be the least motivated group. As rank increases beyond the E-5 level, perceptual judgments of command conditions also increase. Officers in the sample displayed the highest level of motivation and expressed the most disagreement with the NCO's.
- Differences between senior (E-6 & above) and subordinate (E-5 & below) Marines are greatest over conditions of cohesion. However, there is a large variation between units concerning the degree of agreement over the conditions measured.
- A Disparity Index was derived for use as a measure of disunity or disagreement between senior and subordinate Marines in each command. Where disparity over conditions of command preparedness was highest, UA was also highest and vice versa. In addition, the total unit Disparity Index was a significant predictor of UA.
- Unit performance can be improved through recognition by leaders of command conditions as perceived by subordinates. Combat readiness is increased by effecting agreement between ranks through separating fact from faulty judgment, and by correcting, through collective effort, those debilitating conditions accurately perceived by unit members.

#### Intergroup Relations

- Concerning measures of discrimination, the findings suggest that reaction by white Marines for what is termed "reverse discrimination" may primarily be accounted for by majority



group rejection of minority discrimination as an authentic issue for which compensatory policy is justified, rather than perceived majority discrimination.

- White Marines see all conditions of equality as generally positive, compared to black Marines who perceive conditions measured (except majority discrimination) as being in a negative state. Minorities other than black view conditions of equality more favorably than blacks and are in agreement with white Marines over the issue of majority discrimination.
- Perceptions of equality generally improve with educational development for majority and minority enlisted Marines, with the exception of a negative trend for college educated minorities over the issues of climate and justice. College trained enlisted minorities see conditions of justice as being more negative than minorities with eight or less years of education.
- A significant relationship was found between unit UA rates and negative judgments of both minority discrimination and overall equality. In addition, perception of justice was a significant predictor of first term reenlistment rates.
- The Disparity Index, as a measure of disagreement or polarity between majority and minority members of a unit, was significantly associated with first term reenlistment rates on three of the five equality scales.
- Command motivation and performance is directly related to the racial/ethnic composition of a unit. As the proportion of minority to majority members increases in a command, motivational scores decrease and disparity measures increase.
- Several areas of potential institutional discrimination were investigated for actual conditions which would justify perceptions of inequality. The findings include the following:
  - Black Marines in the sample are slightly, but significantly, overrepresented at the E-1/2 level and underrepresented at the E-5 level.
  - Educational bonuses for promotion are equally distributed for white, black, and other minority Marines.
  - The relationship between time in service and rank is equal for white and black Marines, but not equal for nonblack minority Marines.

- At the E-5 level, 82.4% of the nonblack minorities have 4 years or less time in service, while only 53.4% and 44.4% of the white and black Marines respectively have the same amount of experience.
- A final determination of institutional discrimination with regard to advancement in the Marine Corps cannot be made until (a) all the variables such as proficiency and conduct marks, physical, performance, and essential test results, etc., are systematically accounted for, and (b) more precise operational definitions as to what constitutes institutional discrimination are established at the policy-making level.
- In the absence of properly documented facts and more distinct standards, ample "evidence" of discrimination, however misleading, can be found to support perceptions of discrimination, depending on which perspective or criteria an individual or group uses. Moreover, negative perceptions are self-fulfilling motivational elements, since they produce a negative behavioral response which is detrimental to advancement and which, in turn, is perceived as additional evidence of discrimination.

#### Career Planning

- Only 8.4% of the Marines E-5 and below intend to reenlist in the Corps, while 31% are undecided, and 60.6% have decided not to remain beyond their present tour.
- Based on first term reenlistment intentions, the projected junior leadership profile will be generally more educated and will comprise somewhat fewer minority members.
- Nonblack minorities are considerably less inclined toward reenlistment than either white or black Marines at the SNCO level. Only 42.9% of the nonblack minorities intend to reenlist, while 75.5% and 84.6% respectively of the white and black Marines desire to remain in the Corps.
- Marines with less than one year in service are generally more motivated than the 6 to 10 year group. However, there is a precipitous decline in motivation after one year which continues to the third or fourth year. After four years in service, motivation gradually improves to retirement.
- The motivational measures distinguish between the career, undecided, and noncareer oriented groups. In addition, several scale scores correlate significantly with individ-



ual unit reenlistment rates. Therefore, by addressing the concerns associated with the undecided group, it may be possible to triple the present reenlistment rate.

#### Performance and Validity Measures

- The predictive validity of the motivational assessment technique was established using UA and first term reenlistment rates as criteria. Scale scores and disparity measures were significant predictors of performance on seven of the eight scales applied.
- While the LEAP is a valid method for internal leadership evaluation, cross-command comparisons would produce spurious results, since differences between units may be accounted for by other variables such as unit composition, mission, status, and location.

The principal objective of the leader is to control and influence unit members toward maintaining a combat ready status and accomplishing the unit mission. The findings presented in this report suggest that recognition of critical concerns which have a direct bearing on unit performance is an essential step in solving leadership deficiencies. The conditions identified by the LEAP function as management objectives. The leader uses the objectives to motivate members to higher levels of performance.

Since the LEAP is essentially a leadership evaluation procedure, the effectiveness of corrective actions taken can be determined upon reapplication of the techniques. In addition, the issues identified by the LEAP provide valid and relevant content for command discussion sessions.

An anonymous network monitor system is proposed for determining the probability of effectiveness of various corrective procedures, and for communicating solutions to leadership/management objectives based on empirical results. The network monitor system will function as an historical data bank for direct access by field units.

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## INTRODUCTION

### Background

In November 1976 a pilot evaluation study was conducted at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to determine the operational feasibility of the Leadership Evaluation and Analysis Program (LEAP). The LEAP is an organizational/management development program designed to provide small unit commanders with the techniques and procedure by which they may assess leadership concerns, determine the level of unit combat readiness, and evaluate the effectiveness of the decision-making process. Decision-making feedback through periodic application of the LEAP aids the leader in developing the flexibility necessary to control and influence various groups under a variety of conditions and mission requirements.

Although the validity of the LEAP materials has been established, it was also necessary to determine the operational feasibility of the program through pilot application by Marine Corps units under actual field conditions. Since the LEAP is used by individual commanders as a voluntary, self-applied leadership aid, the criteria established for the field evaluation study involved the ability of unit leaders to administer the techniques and interpret the results. Further, evidence had to be obtained which indicated that program results were beneficial enough to unit commanders to warrant future application.

Thirteen company level commands from the 2nd Marine Division, FMF, representing a variety of mission orientations, participated in the field evaluation study. Each command administered the motivational component of the LEAP (Interaction Inventory) and received a command profile analysis report. The report featured total command results and criterion group analyses for rank and ethnic differential response.

Following the information feedback, participant commanders submitted an evaluation statement regarding the value of the LEAP for their purpose. The consensus was favorable indicating that the LEAP is a viable and an effective leadership aid, and the program was considered operationally feasible. A detailed report of the pilot evaluation study, including the verbatim statements of participant commanders, is published in a separate report (Affourtit, 1977).



## Purpose

While the primary mission of the LEAP is to provide a self-development procedure to the small unit leader, the collective results of application offer valuable leadership/management insight for use by all levels of command. The LEAP materials are essentially intelligence gathering devices. Therefore, the secondary mission of the program is to accumulate research data beneficial to the total command, while at the same time maintaining the confidentiality of individual units. The purpose of this report, therefore, is to analyze and interpret the data obtained from the field study for dissemination to appropriate levels of command.

The combined results can be used to formulate or modify personnel policy and to make decisions which are beyond the control of the small unit leader, but which have a direct effect on the conditions which influence unit combat readiness. The same information may also be employed by individual commanders as a guide with which to contrast unit results and to help establish unit standards and objectives.

## Method

### Sample

Over 1130 Marines representing 13 commands completed and returned the motivational assessment component of the LEAP, the Interaction Inventory. Less than one percent (.08%) of the returns were not included in the final analysis due to errors or carelessness on the part of the respondents.

In addition to the data returned for analysis, a number of officers and key staff NCO's used the survey instrument to estimate subordinate response to the issues covered. This procedure was followed to give senior Marines an opportunity to measure their own ability to understand subordinates. These Answer Forms were retained for personal use and were not recorded as part of the sample population.

The Marines in this study represent a proportional stratified sample of the target population viz., the 2nd Marine Division, FMF. A demographic profile of the sample is given in Appendix C.



### Procedure

The data produced by this study were analyzed for the entire sample of Marines as a whole, and by various criterion groups considered appropriate for the issues being investigated. The same approach was used to analyze individual command results for unit feedback.

In addition to the data from the Interaction Inventory items, many Marines in the sample wrote comments on the reverse side of their Answer Form. Marines were urged to qualify their response or expand on any issue covered by the survey. They were also invited to comment on any condition considered pertinent to their command. When such comments were encouraged, replies were extensive and meaningful to the commander. Appendix A includes a selected sample of the verbatim comments made by Marines in the study.

The findings of the study are presented in the RESULTS section of this report. The RESULTS section is divided into specific subsections which examine the data according to principal areas of concern, namely, Total Command Analysis, Senior-Subordinate Interaction, Intergroup Relations, Career Planning, and Performance and Validity Measures.

The RESULTS section gives an objective presentation of the findings. The data are described in terms of factual products or relationships between the variables studied. Descriptive and inferential statistical treatment were applied to the data to support a logically defensible interpretation of the results.

A brief DISCUSSION section is included in the report in an effort to link the results together in a rational manner, and to suggest some plausible interpretations and consequences of the findings. This section may be applied to support recommendations and policy decisions related to the issues covered by the study.

Final statements regarding the meaning of the study for the Marine Corps and the potential for future research projects are given in the CONCLUSION.

## RESULTS

### Total Command Analysis

Unit commanders who use the LEAP are urged to review the results of the motivational survey in progressive stages, beginning with a general examination and proceeding to the more particular findings in a deductive manner. The first step in understanding and interpreting the results, therefore, is to produce a total motivational profile of the command from which various hypotheses or questions are generated. These questions serve as logical guideposts for further, more definitive analyses. This procedure helps the commander organize the data into meaningful segments which may require more critical scrutiny, and which have a plausible relationship to the findings of the total command. In addition, the total review enables a commander to quickly determine whether or not certain outcomes satisfy preestablished motivational goals..

### Motivational Profile

Analysis of the total sample of Marines begins with the scale profile as recorded on the Motivational Analysis Form (MAF) in Figure 1. The scores recorded on the MAF represent the responses by the group to the questionnaire items of the Interaction Inventory converted into single score values. The scores for each scale of measurement are given in terms of percentile, ranging from 0 to 100. Since norms for the Interaction Inventory have not been established, scale scores are fixed along an absolute continuum, with the 50th percentile representing the point below which responses are generally negative, or above which responses are generally positive.

The two primary scales, Command Preparedness and Command Equality, are actually combination scales with scores derived by averaging the subscale scores which comprise each. Similarly, the Motivational LQ ( $LQ_m$ ) is a combination score or aggregate of all the scale scores. Since the two primary scales measure distinct dimensions within the domain of leadership, the  $LQ_m$  is merely a quantitative summary which facilitates overall interpretation, as well as comparisons made over time.

The total scale score for Command Preparedness, as recorded in Figure 1 is 49.2, just below the 50th percentile. This score

Figure 1  
Total Command Motivational Profile

LEAP MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS FORM PART IV Scale Profile	
Reporting Command: <u>2D MARDIV</u> Date of Survey: <u>15-18 Oct 76</u> T/O: <u>--</u> O/H <u>--</u> Date of Previous Survey: <u>--</u> Personnel Surveyed (No.): <u>1127</u> Turnover Ratio: <u>--</u>	
SCALE	PERCENTILE SCORE
1. Command Preparedness . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 49.2%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">49.2</div> </div>
a. Command Efficiency . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 47.9%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">47.9</div> </div>
b. Command Cohesion . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50.5%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">50.5</div> </div>
2. Command Equality . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 59.5%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">59.5</div> </div>
a. Minority Discrimination . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 67.7%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">67.7</div> </div>
b. Majority Discrimination . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 64.8%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">64.8</div> </div>
c. Intergroup Climate . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 55.5%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">55.5</div> </div>
d. Justice . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 54.8%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">54.8</div> </div>
3. Motivational LQ . . . . .	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 54.4%; height: 10px; margin: 2px 0;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;">0                      50                      100</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 10px;">54.4</div> </div>

reflects a lower Command Efficiency score (47.9) and a slightly higher Command Cohesion score (50.5).

All of the Command Equality scale scores are above the 50th percentile, indicating a slightly more positive perception of these motivational conditions by Marines in the sample. However, the Command Equality subscales consist of items which are used to distinguish between ethnic groups, and total scores (especially for



the Minority and Majority Discrimination scales) may obscure individual differences which exist between various groups. Total scores obviously reflect more of a majority group's orientation. An ethnic breakdown, therefore, would be appropriate to determine whether these scores represent a consensus or not. Such criterion group analysis will be covered under Intergroup Relations on page 20.

#### Temporal Comparison

While the scores from a single survey provide information as to where the unit lies on an absolute continuum, a one-time survey produces no standard with which to compare results or to judge progress. When using an absolute standard, scores obtained during one period have more meaning when compared to another period. In this way it is possible to analyze changes occurring over time and to determine the impact of policy decisions made to modify the conditions measured by the first survey.

In the case of the 2nd Marine Division, a previous measure was obtained, although with a different sample, during the development of the Interaction Inventory in July 1975 (Affourtit, 1976).<sup>1</sup> Figure 2 shows the profile comparisons for the two periods studied.

There is an increase in every area of measurement for the 1976 period, the most striking of which occurs in the area of Command Preparedness. The Command Equality indicators are also generally higher with the greatest improvements taking place in the region of Intergroup Climate and Justice.

The  $LQ_m$  comparison reflects an overall change increase of six points. Considering the size of the sample population, a change of this magnitude is statistically significant or beyond chance variation.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The July 1975 sample reported in the LEAP Manual included Marines from 18 separate commands within the 2nd Marine Division and Force Troops Atlantic. The scores of those Marines serving in the Division were extracted for comparison purposes here.

<sup>2</sup> $t$  value = 3.45 ( $p < .001$ ). The usual levels of significance set by convention are .01 and .05, meaning that score differences are of such magnitude that they have a chance probability of occurring only one or five times in a hundred, respectively. The probability statement  $p < .001$  indicates that the difference found between the scores for the two periods would happen by chance only once in a thousand times.

Figure 2

Command Motivational Profile Comparison  
for Two Periods

LEAP	
MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS FORM	
PART IV	
Scale Profile	
Reporting Command: <u>2D MARDIV</u>	Date of Survey: <u>19 Oct 76</u>
T/O: <u>--</u> O/H: <u>---</u>	Date of Previous Survey: <u>19 July 75</u>
Personnel Surveyed (No.): <u>(75) 297</u>	Turnover Ratio: <u>--</u>
Personnel Surveyed (No.): <u>(76) 1127</u>	

SCALE	PERCENTILE SCORE 1975-1976
1. Command Preparedness . . . . .	0 50 100 42/49
a. Command Efficiency . . . . .	0 50 100 40/48
b. Command Cohesion . . . . .	0 50 100 44/51
2. Command Equality . . . . .	0 50 100 55/60
a. Minority Discrimination . . . . .	0 50 100 65/68
b. Majority Discrimination . . . . .	0 50 100 61/65
c. Intergroup Climate . . . . .	0 50 100 50/56
d. Justice . . . . .	0 50 100 49/55
3. Motivational LQ . . . . .	0 50 100 48/54
4. Woman Marine * . . . . .	0 50 100 61
5. Program Evaluation * . . . . .	0 50 100 41

LEAP RMF Dec 1975

\* Scales which measure the role of Women Marines and the effectiveness of formal leadership discussion programs were not used in the 1976 survey.

### Command Preparedness Scales

While the MAF yields a general picture of where the unit stands, the Item Response Summary Form (IRSF) allows the commander to identify specific areas of concern within each dimension of leadership. As shown in Figure 3, the IRSF gives the response to each individual item in each subscale in terms of Percent Response and individual item Scale Score. The four levels of response choice offered in the Inventory are combined into two categories, Agree and Disagree, for ease of interpretation. For the same reason, the middle or neutral category of response is not included.<sup>3</sup> Absolute and relative frequencies of response for each category and item are given in Appendix B.

The Scale Score for each item in the IRSF is derived in the same manner as for the overall (MAF) scores. Regardless of the negative or positive orientation (wording) of an item (indicated by + or -), scale scores signify a point along the continuum ranging from 0 to 100, 100 reflecting the best possible condition and 0 indicating the worst. The IRSF is used to identify the command's strong and weak points by noting the issues which correspond to high and low scale scores.

### Efficiency

A review of the Command Efficiency scale scores given in Figure 3 reveals that most of the concern is associated with issues of troop morale and spirit (item 21), unit organization (item 28), and job satisfaction (item 12). Information dissemination (item 13) and confusion by troops in the command (item 18) are also low points in the area of efficiency.

The high scores are marked by the level of training accomplished in the unit (item 20) and the amount of overall efficiency perceived by Marines in the command (item 15). Only 26% of the Marines consider the command not well trained, while 58% view training as the high point of preparedness. Similarly, the majority of Marines (41%) feel that the command is generally efficient compared to the 32% who perceive the obverse.

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<sup>3</sup> Actual responses by Marines were given in the usual five (5) category Likert scale (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree). The Percent Agree in the IRSF combines the Strongly Agree and Agree categories, while the Percent Disagree combines Strongly Disagree and Disagree responses. The remaining percent (totaling 100%) which is not recorded in the IRSF represents the Neither Agree nor Disagree responses.



Figure 3

### Item Response Summary for Command Preparedness Scales

ITEM RESPONSE SUMMARY					
COMMAND PREPAREDNESS		PERCENT RESPONSE		SCALE SCORE	
No.	Item	Agree	Disagree	0	100
+13.	The troops in this command are well informed.	29	55		44
+15.	This command is efficient.	41	32		55
+21.	Morale and spirit are high in this command.	26	50		43
+25.	Most of the Marines are proud to be in this command.	30	40		49
+28.	This command is well organized.	27	48		43
-12.	Most of the troops in this command are dissatisfied with their job.	45	30		43
-16.	The troops in this command are confused much of the time.	50	32		44
-20.	The troops in this command are not well trained.	22	58		65
-23.	Most of the troops would rather serve in another command.	43	31		46
-27.	The troops in this command are not motivated.	45	33		47
COMMAND EFFICIENCY		TOTAL			47.9
+11.	This command encourages educational development.	42	31		55
+16.	A good example is set for the troops to follow in this command.	30	44		47
+19.	The troops in this command get a lot of help with their personal problems.	32	42		50
+22.	There is a lot of respect between all Marines in this command.	21	57		38
+24.	Staff NCO's have a good understanding of the troops in this command.	30	42		46
+26.	The troops of this command have confidence in their leaders.	31	42		48
+29.	The leaders of this command are responsive to the needs of the troops.	37	38		52
-11.	Staff NCO's do not take the time to help the junior men in this command.	34	43		53
-17.	The troops of this command have no respect for authority.	34	46		53
-19.	The troops of this command are not encouraged to do their best.	25	56		63
COMMAND COHESION		TOTAL			50.5

### Cohesion

With regard to the Command Cohesion factor, low motivational areas are related to a considerable lack of respect between unit members (item 22); 57% of the sample indicate that respect between Marines is minimal. The lack of understanding of troops on the part of staff NCO's is another low point for cohesiveness (item 24). In addition, 44% disagreed that a good example is set for Marines to follow (item 16).

On the positive side, Marines in the command consider themselves to be highly encouraged to do their best (item 30), as well as positively influenced toward self-improvement through educational development (item 55). The latter may present a dilemma for members of some commands, since a number of the Marines surveyed complained that the desire to obtain advanced education is precluded by duty commitments (see Appendix A).

### Range of Command Preparedness Scores

When analyzing a large command consisting of a variety of small, relatively autonomous units with different mission orientations, it is important to determine the range of motivational levels between units. The range is a measure of variance within the total command which reveals the degree to which total command scores (the average) reflect the motivational level of each unit separately. The range also indicates the ability of the measuring instrument to sense differences between units.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 4 shows the range of scores for the Command Preparedness scales for the thirteen commands in the sample. The lowest scoring command in the sample is functioning between the 30th and 40th percentile. The mean scores plot around the 50th percentile, and the highest scoring command reaches a level of functioning between the 75th and 80th percentile.


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<sup>4</sup> Another measure of variance is the standard deviation (SD). The SD determines if differences found within the command sample conform to the normal population parameters of the Gaussian curve. If an acceptable SD can be demonstrated, the application of certain inferential statistics used to interpret the results may be considered valid, and the conclusions drawn are accepted as statistically and logically supportable. The population parameters given in Appendix C show that the data collected from the sample satisfy this criteria.



Figure 4

Range of Command Preparedness Scores



The ultimate goal of the LEAP is to identify those conditions which promote the highly motivated and effectively functioning command, and to determine if the same conditions or methods of leadership can be applied to other commands for the benefit of all Marines. As this report advances to more definitive criterion group analyses, it will be possible to examine some of these conditions in more detail in order to shed some light on the positive and negative aspects of such leadership motivation.

Command Equality Scales

Individual item scale scores are fairly consistent for the Command Equality subscales as displayed on the IRSF in Figure 5. Further, most of the individual issues are considered to be in a generally favorable state (above the 50th percentile).

Figure 5

**Item Response Summary  
for Command Equality Scales**

No.	COMMAND EQUALITY Item	PERCENT RESPONSE		SCALE SCORE
		Agree	Disagree	
-34.	Minority troops have less chance of getting good training opportunities in this command.	13	70	70
-41.	Minority troops are not treated fairly in this command.	18	61	65
-43.	In this command minority troops get punished more severely than others for the same offense.	16	63	67
-45.	In this command minority troops get the worst jobs and details.	15	67	68
MINORITY DISCRIMINATION		TOTAL		67.7
-32.	In this command minority personnel get better treatment than majority troops.	23	50	62
-37.	Minority troops get special privileges in this command.	14	64	69
-46.	Majority troops are discriminated against in this command.	13	60	67
-49.	In this command minority troops get away with breaking rules others are punished for.	24	55	62
MAJORITY DISCRIMINATION		TOTAL		64.8
+35.	Work details are equally distributed in this command.	39	46	47
+36.	Justice is administered equally in this command.	41	35	52
+40.	The troops in this command are judged by their character, not by their color or background.	54	21	62
+42.	Promotions are based on an individual's ability in this command.	47	33	55
+44.	Complaints about discrimination are treated fairly in this command.	32	19	54
+45.	All Marines are treated as equals in this command.	42	36	53
+47.	Everyone in this command has an equal opportunity for a training assignment.	51	29	58
+51.	Punishment and discipline in this command are handled fairly.	49	27	57
JUSTICE		TOTAL		55.5
+33.	Race relations in this command are very good.	44	32	51
+34.	Minority and majority Marines get along well in this command.	48	24	58
-51.	There are many complaints about discrimination and prejudice in this command.	33	46	54
-52.	There is a lot of tension between racial and ethnic groups in this command.	27	47	57
ETHNIC GROUP CLIMATE		TOTAL		54.8

### Minority/Majority Discrimination

The highest subscale scores are recorded for the Minority and Majority Discrimination items, all of which range between 60 and 70 scale units. A strong majority of the Marines in the sample therefore reject (disagree with) the negatively worded statements of these scales, indicating that they see these conditions as being somewhat favorable.

### Justice

There is more variation of response within the Justice scale. The major issue of dissatisfaction concerns the perceived unequal distribution of work details in the command (item 35). Forty-six percent of the Marines consider work assignments to be unfair.

On the positive side, judgments made on the basis of character rather than color or background appear to be the high point of justice (item 40). Only 21% of the Marines feel justice in this regard is improperly administered.

### Intergroup Climate

Indications of ethnic opposition in the command are viewed to be in a generally positive state by the total sample. This scale is the most important indicator of potential group confrontation. Scale scores indicate whether personnel hostility (which may be due to some of the conditions measured by the other subscales) is directed toward peer groups or toward the hierarchy of command.


### Range of Command Equality Scores

As previously stated, the range is an important indicator of command variance as well as a measure of the relative effectiveness with which individual commands are functioning. Figure 6 shows the Command Equality scale scores ranging between the 40th and 80th percentile with the mean fluctuating about the middle of the scale.

The shortest distance between the lowest and highest scoring commands occurs on the Minority Discrimination scale. Again, the degree of variance, as well as the tendency toward higher scores on this scale, may well reflect a strong majority consensus which obscures a dissenting or disagreeing minority group. This possibility will be made more clear when the data are analyzed according to particular criterion groups.

Figure 6

Range of Command Equality Scores



The largest score deviation is found on the Intergroup Climate scale with almost 40 points separating the High and Low commands. The existence of racial/ethnic tension is a valid assumption to make when characterizing the Low command, while intergroup harmony and understanding will distinguish the High scoring command. Again, the underlying goal of the LEAP is to seek causation for such differences in an attempt to improve the status of all Marines.

Senior-Subordinate Interaction

In order for a unit to function effectively during a combat or training situation, the relationship between senior Marines and their subordinates must be sound. Junior Marines must be prepared for quick transition into positions of leadership



during a military crisis. Therefore, senior Marines are required not only to provide technical guidance to others, they must also present a proper role model for subordinate Marines to emulate. How Marines of different ranks interact with respect to unit goals is a fundamental concern of the commander when assessing unit motivation.


Since the Command Preparedness scales cover conditions which are primarily related to leader-follower interaction, analysis of these data from the point of view of specific rank groups is a reasonable way to review the results.

#### Command Preparedness Rank Scores

Figure 7 shows the scale scores for two rank groups, E-5 and below representing one point of view, and staff NCO's/officers representing the other. All of the score differences between groups are statistically significant beyond the .001 level. The greatest difference occurs, not unexpectedly, on the Command Cohesion subscale. SNCO's and officers view conditions of cohesion in a much more favorable light than their subordinates.

Figure 7


Command Preparedness Scores  
For Two Rank Groups



It is possible to analyze the individual items which comprise each of the Command Preparedness subscales and determine the specific points of contention or concurrence which characterize these two groups by reviewing the IRSF in Figure 8.

Figure 8

Item Response Summary  
for Two Rank Groups



### Efficiency

The groups are not too far apart over the individual Command Efficiency issues. Trends follow a generally similar pattern, with NCO and below enlisted Marines viewing conditions in a more negative vein.

Job satisfaction appears to be the strongest point of difference separating the two groups (item 12). In addition, 56% of the enlisted men below E-5 feel inadequately informed about matters in the command (item 13), and 51% indicate they are confused much of the time (item 18). SNCO's and officers on the other hand, do not see these conditions as being as seriously deficient. Of particular note is the reverse judgment of the groups with regard to the level of training in the command (item 20). Marines E-5 and below consider the command to be more highly trained than does the leadership.

### Cohesion

A much greater distinction can be made between the ranks on the Command Cohesion issues. The primary points of contention concern the understanding of subordinates by SNCO's (item 24), and the assistance provided for subordinate's personal problems (item 19). SNCO's generally believe they have a good understanding of their troops, and also that they provide a considerable amount of help to subordinate Marines with personal problems. Enlisted Marines below Staff NCO, however, generally disagree with their leaders on these points.

Agreement between the ranks is seen for the issue of respect between Marines in the command (item 22). Both groups consider this condition to be less than adequate. However, there is positive agreement over the perception that troops in the command are encouraged to perform their best (item 30).

### Rank Disparity

By taking each command separately and measuring the degree of perceptual difference or disagreement between senior and subordinate Marines, it was possible to derive a Disparity Index. Computing a Disparity Index for a command is a method of generating another dimension of leadership with which to study group differences.

Rank disparity between the leaders and followers of a command may be as important, if not more important, a measure of command motivation as the attained scale scores. A Disparity


Index is actually a measure of unity or disunity within a command. If there is little disparity between rank groups but low scale scores, then all Marines recognize that conditions are not good, but they are bound by the fact that all are involved in the situation together, and that deficiencies can be improved through collective effort.

If, however, there is wide disparity between groups in a unit, there is more discord and less opportunity for a collective approach toward improvement. The commander's first task with a command displaying high disparity is to get all rank groups understanding or perceiving unit problems in the same manner.

Figure 9 shows the range of rank disparity found within the sample of commands for the Command Preparedness scales. The single index (score) represents the overall degree of perceptual difference measured between the two rank groups of a command (E-5 and below vs. E-6 and above). The command with the Low index represents the unit with the most senior-subordinate solidarity, where rank members are most compatible. The High command

Figure 9

#### Rank Disparity Index Range






in Figure 9 reflects the unit which displays the most disagreement or disparity. The Mean for all the commands is also given in Figure 9.

#### Rank and Command Motivation

To obtain a more definitive picture of where in the rank structure the most motivational problems lie, Command Preparedness scores were calculated for five separate rank groups as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10

Command Preparedness Scale Scores and Rank



Of particular interest in Figure 10 is the motivational level of the E-1 through E-2 group. The scores of these Marines are almost as high as the E-6 through E-9 rank group, the career oriented Marines. However, conditions deteriorate for the young enlisted Marine as rank is acquired, reaching a low point for the E-3 through E-5 group, the NCO leadership, who represent the least motivated level.

Another interesting point is the considerable difference between the officers' perception of conditions and that of the enlisted men. The question is, even if the officers are more accurate in their judgment of conditions as being more positive, are they aware of the situation as perceived by their troops?<sup>5</sup> Secondly, is the leadership aware that perception of conditions by members represents a reality for them which, in turn, influences the manner in which they perform their duties? The relationship between motivational level and combat readiness in terms of performance will be addressed fully in the Performance and Validity Measures section of this report.

### Intergroup Relations

The Command Equality scales represent conditions within the Marine Corps which have caused considerable strife among personnel. Such issues function as catalysts which drive Marines apart when unity is needed to maintain a readiness status. Part of the problem lies with vague policy and guidelines regarding equal opportunity which promote a lack of understanding by both officers and enlisted men about what constitutes discrimination and inequality. In addition, specific solutions and firm institutional standards are not yet defined for many of these modern leadership problems. A careful analysis of the equality issues from the standpoint of the groups involved will shed some light on the perceptual difficulties which cause disharmony between Marines of different race and ethnic backgrounds.

#### Command Equality Majority/Minority Scores

The Command Equality scale scores for minority and majority group Marines are given in Figure 11.<sup>6</sup> The differences between the two groups are statistically significant on all the scales beyond the .001 level.


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<sup>5</sup>Senior Marines in a unit do have the option of estimating subordinate response to the Interaction Inventory simply by responding to the issues as they believe the troops will. By comparing their estimated responses with group results, leaders are able to determine the degree to which their supposed knowledge of subordinates is accurate.

<sup>6</sup>In the Interaction Inventory, minority Marines were defined according to the categories listed in the Department of Defense race and ethnic codes of minorities (MCO P1080.20). Those Marines who are considered "White Americans" are categorized as majority members.

Figure 11

Command Equality Scale Scores for  
Majority and Minority Groups



The most severe point of opposition between the two groups occurs over the issue of minority discrimination. Minority Marines perceive discrimination toward minorities to be much more critical compared to majority Marines who strongly reject such a notion. The reverse is true for the Majority Discrimination scale. Majority group Marines see themselves as being discriminated against to a greater extent than do minority Marines. Minority Marines, however, see their own situation as being much worse than do majority Marines see their situation.

There is much more agreement between the groups over majority discrimination than for minority discrimination issues. This finding suggests that reaction by white Marines termed "reverse discrimination" may, to a large extent, be accounted for by their rejection of minority discrimination as an authentic issue for which compensatory policy is justified.



Minority Marines also perceive more tension between ethnic groups in the command as indicated by the Intergroup Climate scores. Justice or lack thereof is another point of contention between the groups. Minority Marines consider these issues to be more dissatisfactory than any other factor in the Command Equality scales.

The division between majority and minority troops may be explored more thoroughly by screening individual item responses as displayed on the IRSF in Figure 12.

Disagreement between the Marines is seen to be fairly consistent for the more direct discrimination issues with the exception of item 48. On the latter issue, minority Marines score slightly, but not significantly, below white Marines. This same response pattern is also found for each individual command. Perhaps minority Marines view the concept of discrimination in such an unfavorable light as to react in a generally more negative manner when the point is raised.

Individual items within the Justice scale, for which minority Marines are most dissatisfied, concern a perceived lack of equal distribution of work details (item 35) and unequal administration of justice (item 36). Adequate response to complaints about discrimination (item 44) and the lack of equal treatment for all Marines (item 45) are other negatively perceived conditions for minorities. Majority Marines are in most accord with their minority counterparts over the issue of work detail assignments (item 35). Both groups view the situation as being generally unsatisfactory.<sup>7</sup>

#### Command Equality White/Black/Other Scores

Since most of the racial problems of the past have been associated primarily with black and white Marines, Command Equality scores were separated into Black, White, and Other

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<sup>7</sup>Verbatim comments by Marines to many of the Justice issues are recorded in Appendix A. This information provides additional insight into some of the reasoning behind perceptual responses given to Inventory items.



Figure 12


### Item Response Summary for Majority and Minority Groups

		PERCENT RESPONSE		SCALE SCORE	
		Agree	Disagree	Majority/Minority	
Item					
-34. Minority troops have less chance of getting good training opportunities in this command.	7	79			77/59
		26	51		
-41. Minority troops are not treated fairly in this command.	12	71			71/54
		30	41		
-43. In this command minority troops get punished more severely than others for the same offense.	8	75			76/52
		32	40		
-46. In this command minority troops get the worst jobs and details.	8	78			75/55
		29	44		
MINORITY DISCRIMINATION		TOTAL			75/55
-32. In this command minority personnel get better treatment than majority troops.	26	45			59/67
		18	60		
-37. Minority troops get special privileges in this command.	15	60			67/74
		12	72		
-48. Majority troops are discriminated against in this command.	12	61			68/65
		17	57		
-49. In this command minority troops get away with breaking rules others are punished for.	30	48			57/71
		14	66		
MAJORITY DISCRIMINATION		TOTAL			63/69
+35. Work details are equally distributed in this command.	41	44			49/42
		33	49		
+36. Justice is administered equally in this command.	45	31			57/44
		32	43		
+40. The troops in this command are judged by their character, not by their color or background.	60	17			66/54
		43	30		
+42. Promotions are based on an individual's ability in this command.	48	34			57/52
		43	32		
+44. Complaints about discrimination are treated fairly in this command.	36	13			57/47
		23	29		
+45. All Marines are treated as equals in this command.	48	32			58/45
		30	44		
+47. Everyone in this command has an equal opportunity for a training assignment.	58	23			62/51
		39	38		
+51. Punishment and discipline in this command are handled fairly.	55	23			62/50
		36	36		
JUSTICE		TOTAL			59/48
+33. Race relations in this command are very good.	45	29			55/51
		43	35		
+34. Minority and majority Marines get along well in this command.	52	21			60/53
		42	31		
-31. There are many complaints about discrimination and prejudice in this command.	27	51			59/45
		45	35		
-30. There is a lot of tension between racial and ethnic groups in this command.	24	49			59/53
		32	43		
ETHNIC GROUP CLIMATE		TOTAL			58/51

minority categories. As Figure 13 reveals, minorities other than black neither perceive discrimination against them to as strong a degree as black Marines, nor do they judge these conditions as being in a generally negative state. However, the difference between all three groups over the issue of Minority Discrimination is statistically significant.<sup>8</sup> Further, with the Other minorities extracted from the minority group, the gap between black and white Marines increases.

Figure 13

Command Equality Scores for  
White, Black, and Other Groups



<sup>8</sup>t values: Minority Discrimination, B ≠ O ( $p < .001$ ); O ≠ W ( $p < .001$ ); B ≠ W ( $p < .001$ ). Majority Discrimination, B ≠ W ( $p < .001$ ); B ≠ O ( $p < .001$ ); O = W. Intergroup Climate, W ≠ B ( $p < .001$ ); W ≠ O ( $p < .001$ ); B = O. Justice, W ≠ B ( $p < .001$ ); W ≠ O ( $p < .001$ ); B = O. Command Equality, W ≠ B ( $p < .001$ ); W ≠ O ( $p < .001$ ); B = O.

On the Majority Discrimination scale, white and other minority Marines are in agreement, while blacks move further apart from both groups. The concept of majority or white discrimination then becomes an issue of contention between the two minority groups.


With regard to the Climate and the level of Justice within the command, there is more agreement between the two minority groups as opposed to white Marines, although minorities other than black see conditions in a more favorable light.

### Disparity

Considering the range of disagreement or polarity within the sample, a Disparity Index for Minority versus Majority groups was computed for each of the 13 commands. As Figure 14 indicates, the range of disparity is large, with the Low command showing almost total unity over the equality issues, and the High command reflecting considerable disunity (disparity) between members of racial and ethnic groups.

Figure 14

Racial/Ethnic Disparity Index Range



Again, the fact that some commands are able to function with more unity concerning equality matters is as important, if not more important, as the actual level of equality perceived. The question to be asked here is, if unity among racial/ethnic groups can be attained in some commands and under some conditions, can the same level be achieved for other commands given the leadership factors which produce unity? Some of the conditions which promote unity or cause disparity will be explored below.

#### Educational Level and Command Equality

The analysis of intergroup relations proceeds toward identifying some of the conditions which may influence discord between Marines. Since the issues of racial/ethnic equality are complex, it may be hypothesized that the more educated Marines will have a relatively better understanding of the situation, and will be equipped to deal more effectively with such abstract concepts. It would follow that there is a direct positive relationship between educational development and motivational level, as measured by perception of conditions within a command.

To determine whether this hypothesis is true, correlation coefficients were computed for the Command Equality scale scores and educational level for the three racial/ethnic groups in the sample (excluding officers) as shown in Table 1.

Table 1  
Correlations Between Equality Scores and Educational  
Level for Three Groups (E-1 through E-9)

LEAP Scales	Pearson $r$ Correlation Coefficients		
	White ( $N = 720$ )	Black ( $N = 245$ )	Other ( $N = 138$ )
Command Equality	.088 **	.103 *	.052
Minority Discrimination	.083 **	.156 **	.083
Majority Discrimination	.045	.237 ***	.041
Intergroup Climate	.070 *	.084	.060
Justice	.066 *	-.040	-.001

\*  $p < .05$

\*\*  $p < .01$

\*\*\*  $p < .001$



Some rather interesting trends are apparent in Table 1. First, conditions of Command Equality generally improve with educational level for white Marines. With the exception of the Majority Discrimination scale, motivational progress is statistically significant.

Black Marines also show a significant positive increase over educational level for overall Command Equality and for the Minority and Majority Discrimination scales. There is, however, a small reverse trend over the issue of Justice. The same trend is seen for minorities other than black.

Further investigation of the issues associated with scholastic achievement can be made by plotting the scores of each group along an educational continuum as shown in Figure 15. In this way it is possible to track the trends more definitively for a better understanding of what the above correlations signify.

In Figure 15a the perception of Minority Discrimination is considerably lower for black Marines with less than eight years of education. However, improvement with educational development follows a consistently upward trend to college level.


White Marines with 8th grade or less educational achievement are most opposed to the notion of Minority Discrimination, although college trained white Marines differ only slightly from their less educated counterparts. Other minorities remain fairly stable over this issue regardless of educational level.

Of those Marines with 8th grade or less education, it is the minorities other than black who view conditions of Majority Discrimination in the most negative vein, as shown in Figure 15b. While these conditions remain relatively stable for white Marines across educational groups, conditions of Majority Discrimination are generally seen to improve substantially with education by the black and other groups. The large disagreement between black and white Marines on this issue occurs at the college level, while the opposite is true for the Minority Discrimination issue. At this point it is possible to see just how complex the situation between minority and majority Marines can be.

Regarding the Intergroup Climate issue, which measures a separate dimension of friction between unit members, the most tension is perceived by minorities other than black in the least educated category (Figure 15c). However, a slight decline is detected for both minority groups at the college level. White Marines at the college level see these conditions in the most favorable light compared to their educated minority counterparts.

Figure 15

Educational Level and Equality  
Scores for Three Groups  
(E-1 through E-9)



The Justice factor shows the most critical trend with regard to changes over educational level (Figure 15d). Black Marines with college training see the military system as much more unjust than any of the lesser educated groups.

Considering the negative trends found on the Intergroup Climate and Justice scales for college trained minorities, a quick assumption may be made that these educated Marines possess more accurate information with which to justify their perceptions. Before any such assumptions can be made, however, it is necessary to further explore these conditions for direct evidence which refutes or supports the perceptual data.

#### Rank and Racial/Ethnic Representation

Some government officials consider proportional rank representation to be a proper measure of equal opportunity in the military. Accordingly, the rank profile of an organization should reflect the ratio of minority to majority members. In an often quoted study of Army personnel, disproportionate representation was offered as evidence of institutional discrimination (Nordlie, 1974). Although such a conclusion may be overly simplistic, those who accept the equal proportion theory will be influenced to perceive discrimination if there is evidence of disproportionate representation.

Focusing on the E-1 through E-5 group, Figure 16 presents the rank structure of the Marine sample for three rank categories as recorded on the Inventory Answer Form. The dotted horizontal lines indicate the "expected frequency" for each rank group based on the obtained proportions of each group (White, Black, and Other) in the sample.<sup>9</sup>

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
<sup>9</sup>The majority/minority statistics reported for the 2nd Marine Division (U.S. Marine Corps (Code: MPH), 1977) lists 25% black Marines and 4% minorities other than black. The obtained frequency of minorities in the sample is 22.1% black and 12.4% other minorities.

Differences in statistical composition may be an artifact of the procedure used to obtain racial/ethnic information. In the Interaction Inventory, a list of 17 racial/ethnic categories are presented to the respondent for selection of the code or codes with which he or she identifies. Department of Defense procedure requires an individual to select from a list indicating White, Black, and Other first, before the additional codes are made available. Only those individuals who select the Other category see the additional code list. It is believed that this procedure may cause many minorities who are not aware of the various ethnic codes to select the White category, resulting in an imbalanced statistical profile. Supporting evidence for this possibility comes from several U.S. Army studies which produced the same profile differences to the same degree (O'Mara, 1977).



Figure 16

Proportional Representation  
for Rank and Racial/Ethnic Groups



In order to determine whether the observed variation within each rank category represents a statistically significant deviation from the expected, the Z test for proportional differences was applied. Z test results as shown in Table 2 reveal that black Marines are slightly, but significantly, overrepresented at the E-1 through E-2 level and underrepresented at the E-5 level. White Marines and minorities other than black do not deviate significantly from their "expected" rank levels.

While these findings suggest the presence of institutional discrimination according to standards endorsed by those who support equal distribution, such a conclusion is at least presumptuous until more evidence is gathered. For example, Marines are not promoted on the basis of race or ethnic group. Rank is acquired by satisfying certain standards as outlined in the Marine Corps Promotion Manual (MCO P1400.29B, 1977).



Table 2  
Standard Score (Z) Values for Proportional Differences  
Between Expected and Obtained Rank Representation  
for Three Groups

Group	Rank and Z Value					
	E-1/2	Z	E-3/4	Z	E-5	Z
White	60.2%	-1.82	66.0%	.18	70.5%	1.51
<u>N</u>	(189)		(371)		(105)	
Black	26.1%	2.16 *	21.4%	.45	18.1%	-2.37 *
<u>N</u>	(82)		(120)		(27)	
Other	13.7%	.99	12.6%	.17	11.4%	-0.78
<u>N</u>	(43)		(71)		(17)	

\*  $p < .05$

Time in grade and military experience must be considered when comparing groups. The effect of disciplinary action and occupational field must also be accounted for. Promotion to NCO ranks (E-4 and E-5) requires a sufficient Composite Score which is determined by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps for each occupational field. The Composite Score includes performance and verbal test results, proficiency and conduct marks, as well as bonuses for special duty and education completed. While the application of these criteria for promotion does not rule out discriminatory practice, these factors must be carefully scrutinized before conclusions of discrimination are drawn, blame is levied at any level of command, or corrective policies are instituted.

#### Rank and Educational Development

Since educational development may be used as a bonus for promotion, the relationship between educational level and rank can be investigated to determine whether such bonuses are distributed equally across racial/ethnic lines. If any group is denied the same educational benefit, then evidence of discrimination would be

apparent, and perceptions of inequality would be justified on these grounds. Again, Nordlie presented evidence that black enlisted soldiers had to possess between 10 and 18 months more education than white soldiers before being promoted at the same rate.

Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients for the three Marine Corps racial/ethnic groups across rank and educational level. While not all the correlations are significant, the degree of relationship between rank and education appears to be equivalent.

Table 3

Correlations Between Rank  
and Educational Level for Three  
Groups (E-5 & Below)

Group	<u>N</u>	Pearson <u>r</u>
White	665	.146 ***
Black	230	.150 **
Other	131	.132
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$		

It may be argued that time in service will influence educational level, since those with more military experience will have more opportunity to acquire educational credit. If this is true, the above findings would be distorted to the degree that groups can be distinguished on the grounds of military experience.

One way to determine the extent to which military experience influences educational bonuses for promotion is to conduct partial correlations controlling for time in service. The results of such partial correlations are presented in Table 4. Again, equivalent educational bonuses are apparent.

Table 4

Partial Correlations Between Rank  
and Educational Level Controlling  
for Military Experience

Group	<u>N</u>	Partial <u>r</u>
White	662	.191 ***
Black	226	.217 ***
Other	128	.180 *
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$		

In order to determine whether the above correlations represent an equal educational benefit beyond chance variation, the Z test for correlational differences was applied. The results are presented in Table 5.

Table 5

Z Values for Differences Between  
Rank and Educational Level  
Correlation Coefficients

Group	Fisher's Z Transformation	Z Value <sup>a</sup>
White ( $Z_1$ )	.192	.336
Black ( $Z_2$ )	.218	
Other ( $Z_3$ )	.182	
White ( $Z_1$ )	.192	.103

$$^a Z_1 = Z_2 = Z_3$$



Table 5 shows that the strength of association between rank and education is equivalent across the three racial/ethnic groups. Therefore, discrimination with regard to the assignment of an educational bonus for promotion in the Marine Corps is not supported by these findings.

#### Rank and Military Experience

Military experience or time in grade are other criteria used for promotion. Further evidence of discrimination in the Army was discovered by Nordlie when comparisons between racial groups were made for rank and military experience. Accordingly, over the three-year period studied, black enlisted soldiers required from 10 to 20 months longer than white soldiers to make advanced rank.

To determine whether promotion credit for time in service is distributed equally for the Marine sample, correlations between rank and military experience were computed for each racial/ethnic group. The results presented in Table 6 show highly significant rank-experience relationships for all groups as expected. However, the relationship between rank and time in service for minorities other than black is not as direct as the other groups.

Table 6

Correlations Between Rank  
and Military Experience for  
Three Groups

Group	<u>N</u>	Pearson <u>r</u>
White	665	.690 ***
Black	225	.658 ***
Other	131	.508 ***
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$		

Before any conclusions are drawn from these data, several intervening variables must be accounted for. For example, since educational bonuses are applied equally, different levels of

educational achievement may influence the manner in which military experience is related to rank. Therefore, partial correlations were necessary, this time controlling for educational achievement. The results are given in Table 7.

Table 7

Partial Correlations Between Rank  
and Military Experience Controlling  
for Educational Level

Group	N	Partial $r$
White	662	.697 ***
Black	226	.669 ***
Other	123	.518 ***

\*  $p < .05$       \*\*  $p < .01$       \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Again, correlations are highly significant for all groups, and, again, nonblack minorities apparently possess the least degree of direct relationship. To determine whether the correlational differences above deviate significantly from one another, the Z test was applied. The results are presented in Table 8.

As Table 8 reveals, correlations between black and white Marines are equivalent, while the relationship between military experience and rank is different enough for nonblack minorities to be considered significant. The difference discovered here suggests some kind of inequity, and the results point to a number of interpretations. The data thus far have made possible identification of a potential problem area, viz., racial/ethnic discrimination with regard to time in service and the acquisition of rank. Specifically what the inequality represents, and which group may be favored or discriminated against, must be explained through more definitive investigation.

The first step in discovering specific cause is to apply an appropriate statistical design to the data in order to locate the source of the problem. Since the attention is now focused on military experience and rank, application of  $\chi^2$  tests to each

rank category were made to determine whether differences between experience and rank are related to a particular rank level or spread throughout all ranks. The  $\chi^2$  test functions as a sensing device to detect significant deviations or imbalance within each category, much like tactical sensing devices locate specific areas of disturbance.

Table 8

Z Values for Differences  
Between Correlation Coefficients

Group	Fisher's Z Transformation	Z Value <sup>a</sup>
White ( $Z_1$ )	.858	.607
Black ( $Z_2$ )	.811	
Other ( $Z_3$ )	.576	
White ( $Z_1$ )	.858	2.077 *
		2.893 **

\*  $p < .05$       \*\*  $p < .01$

<sup>a</sup> $Z_1 = Z_2, Z_1 \neq Z_3, Z_2 \neq Z_3$

As presented in Table 9,  $\chi^2$  results have identified the E-5 level as the rank with most distortion insofar as time in service and racial/ethnic groups are concerned.

Now that the problem area is located, it is possible to amplify the data for the E-5 rank category and describe the nature of the disturbance or, in this case, the inequity. Amplification of an aerial reconnaissance photo would be an appropriate tactical analogy here. The results are given in Figure 17.



Table 9

$\chi^2$  Results for Contingencies Between  
Racial/Ethnic Groups and Military  
Experience for Three Rank Levels

Rank Level	$\chi^2$	Degrees of Freedom
E-1/2	9.79	10
E-3/4	12.89	10
E-5	35.54 ***	12

\*  $p < .05$


\*\*  $p < .01$

\*\*\*  $p < .001$

Figure 17a shows the E-5 data in terms of observed frequency for time in service along with expected frequencies for each racial/ethnic group, while Figure 17b indicates the cumulative frequencies for E-5 and time in service for the three groups.

Figure 17

#### E-5 Rank Distribution by Time in Service for Three Groups



Minorities other than black represent 28.6% of the E-5 Marines with three years or less time in service, far beyond their expected frequency of 12.4%. White and black Marines, however, are underrepresented at this level. Black E-5's with four years or less military experience continue to be underrepresented, while white Marines increase their representation at the three to four year level. White Marines then become overrepresented at the six to ten year level.

Considering the cumulative frequencies for rank and experience of each group, Figure 17b reveals that 35.3% of the nonblack minority E-5 Marines have less than three years in service, while only 11.4 and 11.1% of the white and black Marines, respectively, have the same amount of experience. By the fourth year, 82.4% of the nonblack E-5 minorities are accounted for at the E-5 level, while 53.3% of the white and 44.4% of the black Marines have four years or less time in service.

The data presented in Figure 17 raise a number of questions, and it is important to pause and consider what the findings mean at this point. First, is the imbalance displayed above due to a heavy influx or recruiting blitz of nonblack minorities several years ago? Where are the remaining nonblack minority Marines with over four years of service? Are they leaving the Marine Corps after their first enlistment in much greater numbers than others? Are nonblack minorities overrepresented in a career field which has lower Composite Score standards for promotion? Or, are the obtained results an unusual sample fluke, not really representative of the 2nd Marine Division or the Marine Corps?

There is the possibility that nonblack minorities are being promoted at a more rapid pace than other Marines. However, while the data collected for this study suggest that nonblack minorities are overrepresented at the E-6 through E-9 level, the small number of Marines sampled at these levels precludes any such conclusive interpretation.

If minorities other than black are being accelerated in rank disproportionately, it may mean that the affirmative action concept is being overapplied in favor of certain minorities. The result may be termed "reverse institutional discrimination" for white Marines and "compound institutional discrimination" for black Marines. Before any final determination is made, such additional criteria as proficiency and conduct marks, disciplinary procedures, test results, and performance scores must be carefully studied.

A complete analysis of the above condition is beyond the scope of the present study. However, it is important to point out the essential complexity of the entire intergroup relations issue,

and to consider the likelihood of drawing erroneous conclusions. For example, while the rank and racial/ethnic representation data presented in Figure 16 showed that white Marines are slightly overrepresented at the E-5 level, a closer view of the E-5's show that many white Marines have been at that rank level longer, as indicated by their disproportionate numbers in the six to ten year group. Further, black Marines are both underrepresented at the E-5 level and overrepresented within the four to six year category.

Regardless of the reasons or actual causes for the above demographic findings, the main purpose of this analysis is to discern the genesis of negative perceptions on the part of Marines in this sample. Any group could find ample evidence, however misleading, to support claims of discrimination or injustice. At the beginning of this section, perceptual results showed that black Marines see a considerable amount of discrimination and injustice toward themselves. White Marines, on the other hand, are emphatically opposed to the idea of minority discrimination. Nonblack minorities, however, see the issue of minority discrimination as being somewhat positive, in between white and black Marines. In addition, the nonblack minority group perceives conditions of majority discrimination the same as majority Marines.

Combining the perceptual and demographic data and considering only one possible outcome, if white Marines see their minority peers, regardless of color, receiving promotions at an unusually rapid pace, their tendency would be to strongly reject any notion of minority discrimination. If black Marines, on the other hand, associate "white" minorities with majority members, then the same condition would produce perceptions of discriminatory practice against blacks. Both black and white Marines in the sample would then have "evidence" to support their judgment of the situation.

#### Experimental Perceptual and Attitudinal Measures

Before leaving the section on Intergroup Relations, consideration must be given to several items included in the survey for measuring experimental perceptions and general attitudes.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> In the LEAP Manual, a distinction is made between the measurement of perceptions and attitudes. Operationally defined command perceptions imply direct experience with the issue or condition being assessed. Command perceptual items are prefaced by or include the words "in this command" and reflect those conditions



Since the issues measured by these items are beyond the direct responsibility of the unit commander, they are used on an optional basis, no scores are given, and results are not tabulated as part of an LQ.

The items which fall into this category cover issues of Ethnic Alliance, Pride, and Affiliation. These issues were systematically selected by a Marine sample as representing some of the more critical issues under the topic of intergroup relations. The information gained by these items may be useful to the commander in determining the influence which certain environmental and attitudinal dispositions have on perceptions of command conditions. Moreover, through a better understanding of a unit's orientation toward a particular issue, a commander may be able to predict the impact of potential counteractive measures designed to overcome command problems. For example, a decision made to enforce barracks integration would be accepted as a positive step by groups who possess a positive attitude about the policy of integration. However, such a policy may be far too expedient if implemented in a command where members harbor the opposite attitude. The commander, then, can gauge the gravity of certain corrective decisions where such complex and arbitrary issues as racial/ethnic relations are concerned, and thereby avoid creating a more volatile situation.

Table 10 lists the responses made by majority and minority Marines to related experimental perception and attitude items. As Table 10 shows, Marines in the command generally align with their own majority or minority members while on and off duty (items 39 & 52). Both groups see this condition as being about the same. Concerning the belief that integration between members of diverse groups is a positive condition, again members of both groups generally agree to about the same degree (items 55, 58, & 62). This is a classic case where most people realize that a condition of separation exists, while at the same time, agree that the opposite situation would be more beneficial.

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(10 Cont.) which fall under the direct responsibility of the unit commander. Attitudinal statements, on the other hand, concern conditions not necessarily experienced, fall more within the realm of opinion, and are considered outside the direct responsibility of the unit commander.

Experimental perceptions are distinguished from both command perceptions and attitudes by, (a) the condition perceived is directly experienced as occurring in the command, but (b) the commander is not directly responsible for the condition perceived.

Table 10  
Majority and Minority Response  
To Experimental Perception and Attitude Items

Statement	Percent Response			
	Agree		Disagree	
	Maj.	Min.	Maj.	Min.
Ethnic Alliance				
39. Most minority troops stick to themselves in this command.	53	49	27	30
52. After duty hours, the troops in this command stick together in groups of their own race and ethnic background.	56	47	22	29
Ethnic Affiliation				
55. Integration or mixing between racial and ethnic groups does more harm than good.	24	22	49	52
58. It's better when racial groups don't mix.	23	26	48	46
62. It is better for minority and majority troops to hang around together after duty hours.	36	34	20	26
54. In order to stay out of trouble it is best to avoid those with different background and values from my own.	34	38	41	34

However, with reference to item 54, a high proportion of Marines suggest that avoidance of mixing is the best way to stay out of trouble. Therefore, even if troops are inclined toward more affiliation, they are blocked by the belief that such a move would threaten the status quo. It may be that change is made difficult by the threat imposed by members of both groups who are opposed to inter-group affiliation.

Table 11 reveals some interesting responses concerning the issue of ethnic pride. While both groups almost totally agree that people should express pride in their ethnic heritage (item 56), and also agree somewhat over the basic purpose of ethnic symbols (item 59), there is considerable disagreement regarding the motives of those who use symbols to express ethnic pride (item 61). Three out of four majority Marines are either uncertain about or believe that symbolic racial expression is an attempt to create trouble. Minority Marines, on the other hand, generally reject this interpretation.

Table 11

Majority and Minority Response  
to Ethnic Pride Attitudes

Statement	Percent Response			
	Agree		Disagree	
	Maj.	Min.	Maj.	Min.
56. People should show pride in their race and ethnic background.	78	84	6	5
59. Racial and ethnic symbols make people proud of their background.	34	49	28	20
61. Groups who use symbols to show off their race are really trying to start trouble.	39	16	25	64

These results suggest that one of the impediments to inter-group harmony is the belief on the part of many white Marines that certain ethnic symbols represent a hostile act. Since few minority Marines see aggression in such symbolism, an underlying cause for polarity may be the misunderstanding of a cultural norm for self-expression. The issue is not whether expression of ethnic pride is proper; confrontation occurs over the manner in which expression is made.



The attitudes and perceptions addressed in this subsection encompass potential problem areas for Marines of any unit. While the commander is not directly responsible for affiliation among unit members or how they feel about certain arbitrary issues, such mental sets do have an influence on command conditions. Therefore, proper coverage of these issues during unit discussion periods may be beneficial to the command.

### Career Planning

The all-volunteer force concept combined with declining reenlistment rates has made career planning a critical area of concern for the Marine Corps. Not only is there interest in the numbers of Marines entering and remaining in the Corps, but emphasis is also placed on the type of Marine required for the technological demands of the future. Can the Marine Corps attract and retain those who are willing and able to learn sophisticated weaponry? Will the future Marine be able to withstand the physical and mental pressure of a highly mobile, constantly ready status? And, will potential junior leadership be capable of controlling the subordinate problems caused by conditions of constant personnel turmoil?

Additional points of growing concern among officials are the ethnic composition and specialty orientation of groups in the future Marine Corps. Policy makers are most sensitive to the double-barrel issue of potentially high ethnic loss during combat and public response to an increasing minority military.


Marines in the 2nd Marine Division who completed the Interaction Inventory recorded their intentions with regard to a career in the Corps. Respondents were simply asked to indicate whether or not they have decided to remain in the Marine Corps or if they were undecided. This section covers some of the demographic characteristics and motivational responses of each career category.

### Career Intention and Educational Level

Concerning first-term reenlistment projections, Figure 18 shows the percentage of Marines E-5 and below who decided Yes to make the Marine Corps a career, were Undecided about remaining in the Corps, and who responded No to the question of career intention. The educational range of each category is also given.

Figure 18

Career Intention and Educational Level



Only 8.4% of the sample say they intend to remain in the Corps, while 31.0% are undecided, and 60.6% indicate they definitely decided not to extend beyond their present enlistment. Fortunately, the Yes group is generally more educated than either the Undecided or the No groups. Seventy-seven percent of the Yes group have either completed high school or have some college training. The Undecided group has the second highest educational level with 62.4% and 5.6% respectively of high school completions and college experience. The No group is least educated overall, 35.8% do not possess high school diplomas.

Career Intention and Racial/Ethnic Composition

Regarding the racial/ethnic composition of those intending to reenlist, as shown in Table 12, 29.1% are minority Marines and 70.9% are members of the majority group. Considering the obtained

proportion of the sample, these figures represent a projected composition of 3.5% and 2.1% less black and other minority Marines, respectively.

Table 12

Career Intention and Racial/Ethnic  
Composition of Marines E-5 and below

Career Intention	Ethnic Group		
	White	Black	Other
Yes	70.9	18.6	10.5
Undecided	69.7	21.8	8.5
No	61.3	23.4	15.3

The Undecided group is comprised of 69.7% majority members and 30.3% minorities, about the same as the Yes group. The No category includes 38.7% minorities which represents an increase of 5% for black and nonblack minorities over the Yes group.

Senior Career Intention

Shifting attention to senior career orientation, Table 13 reveals that 18.8% and 7.2% respectively of the Marine E-6 through E-9 are undecided about remaining in the Corps or plan to leave upon completion of their present tour. Of the officers in the sample, 47.1% are uncertain about remaining in the Corps, while 11.8% have decided not to reenlist.

Senior Composition

The senior racial/ethnic profile for staff NCO's may be viewed from two perspectives, as presented in Table 14. The Between percentage indicates the responses for each group, while the Within figures reflect the composition of each career category.

First, a larger percentage of white and black Marines intend to reenlist for another tour, compared to the nonblack minority group. Considering the Yes, Within category only, the composition of the Corps would change drastically if this sample



Table 13  
Career Intention of  
Staff NCO's and Officers

Rank	Career Response		
	Yes	Undecided	No
E-6 to E-9	73.9	18.8	7.2
Officers	41.2	47.1	11.8

Table 14  
Senior (SNCO) Career Intention  
by Racial/Ethnic Group

Group	Career Intention					
	Yes		Undecided		No	
	Between	Within	Between	Within	Between	Within
White	75.5%	(72.5%)	20.4%	(76.9%)	4.1%	(40.0%)
Black	84.6%	(21.6%)	7.7%	(7.7%)	7.7%	(20.9%)
Other	42.9%	(5.9%)	28.6%	(15.4%)	28.6%	(40.0%)


proportion is used as a standard. White Marines will increase in proportion and the outflux of nonblack minorities, found with first-term reelistment projections, will continue at a more precipitous rate for SNCO's. However, while 57.2% of the nonblack SNCO's fall into the Undecided and No categories, black Marines are much more certain about remaining in the Corps at this rank level. If this projection is manifest, the proportion of black SNCO's will remain about the same while white SNCO's will increase in number.

#### Career Intention and Motivational Level

Using the Inventory scale scores as criteria, it was possible to determine the motivational level of each career category. Figure 19 shows the levels of motivation for Command Preparedness increasing with career orientation. Motivational scale scores

Figure 19

Career Intention and Motivational  
Level for Command Preparedness Scales




range from the low 40's for the No group to the 50's for the Yes group. The Undecided Marines range between the other two groups.

Figure 20 shows the same motivational pattern for the Command Equality scales.

These findings not only add further validity to the LEAP scales, but the career planning situation may be analyzed in terms of the individual conditions or issues which must be addressed in order to retain the career oriented Yes Marines and to motivate the Undecided group toward retention. With the information contained in these data, it may be possible for the Marine Corps to triple the present retention rate. Career motivation can be accomplished by leadership influence which affects the issues measured in a positive manner. It is also possible to concentrate career retention efforts toward the higher educated Marine or those in critical specialty fields by making the desired distinction in the data analysis.

Figure 20

Career Intention and Motivational  
Level for Command Equality Scales



Time in Corps and Command Motivation

Of interest to commanders and career planners alike is knowledge of what happens to Marines as they progress in the Corps in terms of motivation. Figure 21 provides a dramatic answer to the question of motivational level and time in service.


Regarding the Command Preparedness scales, Marines with less than one year in service are more motivated than the six to ten year Marines and almost as motivated as the ten to fifteen year group. The lowest level of functioning occurs during the third and fourth years. A similar pattern is found for conditions of Command Equality.

These findings suggest two possible interpretations. First, Marines just out of recruit training have a high opinion of the Corps and express a very positive outlook. But, such high expectations are not reenforced by experience. This means that Marines grow progressively more dissatisfied during their first duty assignment.



Figure 21

Command Motivation and Time in Corps



However, since this survey represents a single point in time, the results may really be measuring a difference in generations of Marines or in recruiting practices over the years. The results, therefore, may reflect the outcome of recent attempts to induct higher quality personnel into the Marine Corps. If this interpretation is correct, the trend shown in Figure 21 will reverse for the one through six year group. It will be possible to track such a likelihood with future surveys.

## Performance and Validity Measures

The Interaction Inventory deals primarily with responses by Marines to questions about conditions in their respective commands. These responses are tabulated and then translated into scale scores which represent certain critical factors within the domain of leadership. Collectively, the perceptual scores measure the motivational level of a command. A command's motivational level, then, is a reflection of the manner in which the command is functioning as perceived by the Marines who comprise the command.

Actual conditions within a command, however, may or may not be perceived accurately by unit personnel. The accuracy of perceptual judgment by any group can range anywhere along a continuum from totally correct to incorrect. While perceptions may describe conditions inaccurately, the rationale for perceptual measurement is based on the fact that such measurement predicts a behavioral outcome. It is the perception of conditions, whether accurate or not, which motivates an individual or a group toward a particular course of action. For example, perceptions of injustice and discrimination may motivate unit personnel toward absenteeism, racial incidents, or indifference to duty. Perceptions of command inefficiency and group disparity may produce a lowered desire for a career in the Marine Corps or a rejection of unit responsibility. On the other hand, positive perceptions will generate a greater response to duty, a higher incidence of reenlistment, and a disinclination toward escaping responsibility.

The validity of a motivational assessment instrument is determined by the degree to which scale scores can predict a performance or behavioral response. Therefore, before a perceptual measuring instrument can be considered a valid reflection of command motivation, evidence must be produced, in accordance with professional standards, showing the relationship between scores and a predictive criteria. Because of the difficulty in obtaining adequate performance criteria, few motivational measuring instruments achieve such standards of validity.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>There are a number of other types of validity which may also justify the application of perceptual and attitudinal instruments. These include content and construct validity, internal consistency, factorial validity, and unidimensionality, to name some of the most appropriate. As reported in the LEAP manual (Affourtit, 1976), evidence of such validity was produced during the development of the Interaction Inventory.

The commands which participated in this study made unit records of certain performances available for tabulation. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to present the results of predictive correlations between LEAP scale scores and measures of unit performance.

#### Scale Scores and Unauthorized Absence

In an effort to test the assumption that the motivational assessment technique used in this survey actually measures combat readiness performance, the relationship between Interaction Inventory scale scores and unauthorized absenteeism was investigated.

Unauthorized absenteeism (UA) for each command was calculated on the basis of the number of individual Marines absent over a 24-hour period for the months of October and November 1976. These statistics excluded consecutive as well as joined or assigned UA's. To obtain a single UA index for each command, the number of UA's for the period was divided by the on-hand strength (O/H) of the unit. Since O/H figures vary from day to day, the number of personnel recorded on the unit's morning report for the 1st, 15th and 30th of each month was used to derive an average.<sup>12</sup>

Only those commands with at least 40% unit participation in the survey were included in this analysis. The correlations between LEAP scales and command UA's are given in Table 15.

All of the correlations are in the expected direction showing a consistent negative relationship between Inventory scale scores and UA's. Coefficients for the Command Cohesion and the overall Command Equality scales are significant at the 5% level of confidence. The predictive relationship between Minority Discrimination and UA is extremely high, reaching a confidence level of less than one in a thousand. These results are reinforced by previous data showing a significant relationship between scale scores and UA/desertion rates for large commands (Affourtit, op cit).

In practical terms, these findings reveal that in commands where members perceive the least amount of cohesion or the most inequality and minority discrimination, there is also the highest UA rate and vice versa. This trend is linear enough to be a

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<sup>12</sup>Chapter 2 of the LEAP Manual describes the procedure for calculating performance indices as recorded on the Leadership Analysis Form (LAF). LAF measures are used by leaders in determining the relationship between motivational conditions and various unit performances.



significant predictor. Therefore, UA rates may be controlled by leaders who identify and correct these conditions when negatively perceived by the command.

Table 15  
Correlations Between Leap Scales  
and Unauthorized Absenteeism  
(N=11)

LEAP Scales	Kendall (tau) Coefficients UA Rates
Command Preparedness	-.236
Command Efficiency	-.164
Command Cohesion	-.418 *
Command Equality	-.382 *
Minority Discrimination	-.746 ***
Majority Discrimination	-.346
Intergroup Climate	-.236
Justice	-.200
Motivational LQ	-.346
<hr/>	
* p < .05	** p < .01
*** p < .001	

#### Scale Scores and Career Retention

A second performance criterion used to test the predictive validity of the LEAP scales is career retention figures. First term reenlistment rates for each command were calculated for September, October, and November 1976 by dividing the number of potential accessions into the number of actual reenlistments. Only commands with at least 40% survey participation and at least two potential accessions were included in the analysis.

The results as presented in Table 16 show a consistently positive correlation between scale scores and retention rates. While all the correlations are high, reenlistment in a command

is significantly associated with measures of Command Cohesion and Justice. That is, first term reenlistments are highest in those commands where most cohesion and justice is found and vice versa. The trend is linear and predictable.

Table 16

Correlations Between LEAP Scales  
and Career Retention Rates  
(N=10)

LEAP Scales	Kendall (tau) Coefficients
	CR Rates
Command Preparedness	.289
Command Efficiency	.289
Command Cohesion	.467 *
Command Equality	.333
Minority Discrimination	.333
Majority Discrimination	.244
Intergroup Climate	.111
Justice	.511 *
Motivational LQ	.333

\*  $p < .05$

Disparity Index and Predictor Variables

As previously mentioned, command disparity, as a measure of the degree of difference in perceptual judgment between groups within a unit, may also be an effective leadership indicator. The Disparity Index (DI) was developed to measure the perceptual distance between senior and subordinate Marines on issues of Command Preparedness, and the perceptual distance between minority and majority Marines on the issues of Command Equality. The DI for each command was calculated and correlated with unit UA rates and career retention figures as shown in Table 17.

Table 17  
Correlations Between Disparity Indices  
and Predictor Variables

LEAP Disparity Indices	Pearson <u>r</u> Coefficients	
	UA Rates (N=11)	CR Rates (N=10)
Command Preparedness	.667 **	-.060
Command Efficiency	.512 *	-.114
Command Cohesion	.517 *	-.269
Command Equality	.338	-.737 **
Minority Discrimination	.492	-.501
Majority Discrimination	.053	-.311
Intergroup Climate	.070	-.548 *
Justice	.370	-.680 **
Disparity LQ	.687 **	-.433

\*  $p < .05$       \*\*  $p < .01$

As Table 17 reveals, the unity between members of a command, as measured by the DI, is also an efficient predictor of both UA rates and career retention. Therefore, the leader's ability to influence this condition will effect higher reenlistment rates and lower absenteeism.

These findings support the hypothesis that unit disparity between senior and subordinate Marines over conditions of cohesiveness and efficiency is significantly correlated with UA rates. In other words, absenteeism is a function of disunity within a command concerning command proficiency and response to authority. In addition, UA rates can be predicted on the basis of a command's total motivational Disparity Index. The predictive validity of the Disparity Quotient is beyond the one percent level of confidence.

With respect to career retention rates, unity between majority and minority Marines over conditions of justice, climate and overall equality has a direct relationship with first term reenlistment rates. These findings are significant beyond chance variation.



### Command Comparisons on the Basis of Scale Scores and Disparity Indices

At this point it is important to consider a very critical question regarding the use of LEAP data, viz.: Can senior commanders use LEAP scores to judge company level leadership capability? The answer to the question is simply no, but the explanation is more complex.

First, while there is a significant correlation between LEAP scores and performance criteria, the relationships presented above do not account for all the variance measured. The proportion of the variance in one condition which accounts for the other is not 100%. Such a situation is rarely, if ever, found in a "real world" environment. Table 18 lists the percent of variance for which the above correlations account, called the coefficients of determination.

Table 18  
Coefficients of Determination Between Performance  
Criteria and Predictor Variables

LEAP Scales	Coefficients of Determination			
	Scores/UA	Scores/CR	DI/UA	DI/CR
Command Preparedness	.056	.084	.458 *	.004
Command Efficiency	.027	.084	.262 *	.013
Command Cohesion	.175 *	.218 *	.267 *	.072
Command Equality	.146 *	.111	.114	.543 **
Minority Discrimination	.557 **	.111	.242	.251
Majority Discrimination	.120	.060	.003	.097
Intergroup Climate	.013	.012	.005	.300 **
Justice	.040	.261 *	.116	.462 **
Motivational/Disparity LQ	.120	.111	.472 **	.187

\*  $p < .05$

\*\*  $p < .01$

There are a number of factors which affect the performances or perceptions of any command such as unit size, location, mission, situation (e.g., deployment status), and composition, to name a few. Any attempt to compare commands on the basis of scores would be invalid to the degree that other factors influence differences. For example, it was discovered in this study that the racial/ethnic composition of a unit has a significant impact on the unit's performance and motivation. As Table 19 reveals, LEAP scores are also a function of the proportion of minority Marines to the total command.

Table 19

Correlations Between LEAP Scores  
and Majority/Minority Ratios

LEAP Scales	Spearman (rho) Coefficients	
	Scale Scores	Disparity Indices
Command Preparedness	-.200	.409
Command Efficiency	-.109	.064
Command Cohesion	-.518 *	.518 *
Command Equality	-.300	.372
Minority Discr.	-.573 *	.473
Majority Discr.	-.164	.046
Intergroup Climate	-.064	.236
Justice	-.273	.573 *
Motivational/Disparity Quotients	-.309	.510 *

\*  
p < .05

These findings indicate that, as the number of minority Marines increase in a command, negative perceptions of relevant command conditions also increase along with associated performance deficiencies.

To summarize the primary point of this subsection:

While LEAP motivational scores have a predictable relationship with leadership performance criteria, cross-command comparisons are spurious

to the degree that all the variables which influence performance are not properly controlled or accounted for.

The LEAP is an effective method for internal command comparisons and for decision-making feedback at the level for which the program was designed, viz., company, battery, and squadron. Moreover, global data, systematically analyzed, can provide valid information for high level command decisions. However, unit to unit comparison for the purpose of judging leadership capability is no more accurate than the readiness information already available to senior commanders.



## DISCUSSION

The purpose of this report is to furnish leadership/management information, based on systematic assessment of individual field units, for use by appropriate Marine Corps commands. This information may be used by commands who utilize the LEAP as a guide to facilitate unit analyses and to help establish unit standards and objectives.

As an intelligence-gathering method, the data produced by the LEAP provide the leader with insight into the collective motivation of a command concerning issues which are directly related to unit combat readiness/effectiveness. The conditions identified by the LEAP function as management objectives. The commander uses the objectives to motivate members toward higher levels of performance. The LEAP also functions as a decision-making feedback process which assists the leader in developing group, task, and situational flexibility. In addition, the survey data supply relevant and valid content for unit discussion programs.

The data of this study were analyzed to cover a variety of critical leadership issues. The subjects of efficiency and cohesion were examined from the point of view of senior and subordinate Marines. The results reveal that Marines of different rank groups generally do not agree on issues of preparedness; however, there is a wide range between commands in the degree to which unit members agree on the issues covered.

The Disparity Index was conceptualized and applied as a measure of agreement between unit members. It was discovered that duty time lost through UA occurred less in commands where agreement between senior and subordinate Marines was high and vice versa. This trend was statistically significant for all the Command Preparedness scales, as well as for the total Disparity Quotient.

Regarding the motivational level of each rank separately, it was found that Marine NCO's represent the least motivated group. In addition, as rank increases beyond the E-5 level, perceptual judgment of conditions also increases. Officers in the sample displayed the most positive judgment of conditions and expressed the most disagreement (disparity) with the NCO's.

Recognition on the part of leaders of command conditions as perceived by unit members is one of the most important aspects of leadership. A key feature of the LEAP survey is that the procedure allows senior Marines the option of estimating subordinate

response. The outcome is a measure of how well leaders know their personnel.

In order to improve unit combat readiness, the job of the commander is twofold. First, the leader must effect agreement between ranks over command conditions by separating facts from faulty judgment. And second, the leader must correct, through collective effort, those debilitating conditions accurately perceived by unit members.

The most complex topic covered in this report concerned racial/ethnic relations. The issues were extensively analyzed in an effort to show the complexity of the problem and to demonstrate the ease with which initial research information and improperly analyzed data can lead to erroneous assumptions of discriminatory practice. Answers to primary questions in this area almost always generate more questions.

As evidenced from the results of this survey and supported by other reports as well as recent incidents, the issues of racial/ethnic equality, climate, and justice remain critical concerns for most Marines. The priority placed on these conditions by Marines is justified by the direct relationship found between ratings of equality and unit performance criteria.

Notwithstanding the question of perceptual accuracy, there is a fundamental dilemma facing those who perceive themselves as being discriminated against. The perception of discrimination produces a negative behavioral response which is detrimental to advancement in the Corps and which, in turn, is perceived as additional evidence of discrimination. The situation escalates and becomes a self-fulfilling vicious cycle for many Marines who could benefit from proper guidance. Compensatory steps taken in the past to correct this condition have produced a growing disaffection between majority and minority Marines which also encourages absenteeism and deteriorates the desire to remain in the Corps.

The situation is amplified by the denial or lack of understanding on the part of leaders as to the importance or complexity of these issues. These findings are supported by a recently released joint service study of equal opportunity and race relations in the military (Beusse et al., 1976). Marine enlisted personnel saw more evidence of discrimination and racial unrest than their counterparts in the other services. And, Marine officers expressed the most disagreement with their enlisted members over these issues.

Recognition of these conditions at higher levels of command is insufficient since the demand for a better record has persuaded small unit leaders in all services to transcend accuracy in report-

ing racially motivated incidents. Unreported incidents are rationalized on the grounds of self-protection as well as a desire for more decentralized control of unit events.

The findings at this point merely suggest hypotheses to be tested by a more systematic attack on the problem throughout the Marine Corps. For years since the racial/ethnic issue was first acknowledged in the military, poorly designed efforts seeking expedient solutions were instituted which may have actually intensified or prolonged the problem.

The military needs a course of action which solves problems, not redistributes them, equalizes them, or hides them. Specific solutions and firm institutional standards must be defined for many of these modern leadership problems. Issues involving the interaction of divergent groups must be resolved, and the concept of institutional discrimination must be fully understood and clearly delineated by officials at the highest levels. Moreover, guidelines concerning command level responsibility for overcoming handicaps brought from civilian life should be agreed upon and implemented in an impartial manner.

Perhaps the solutions which have long escaped government officials will be found through further exploration of those units which have been successful in promoting harmony among personnel.

On the basis of this survey it was also possible to project end strengths in terms of a number of demographic characteristics. The information generated from this and future analyses will assist career planners in calculating future personnel needs.

Beyond basic personnel projections, career planners can identify the motivational patterns of certain critical MOS fields and educational levels. In addition, it will be possible to track Marines as they progress in the Corps. There is a need to know what happens to Marines after assignment to a first duty station. Are the expectations inspired during recruit training met upon arrival to a new unit? What methods of leadership are effective in influencing the new Marine to higher levels of performance? What issues must be addressed to maintain pride in unit and Corps as rank and responsibility are acquired? And, what conditions must be improved to promote the retention of those Marines with the most potential?

The results gathered at this point suggest that the profile of the future Marine Corps can be controlled by proper understanding of the present Marine and systematic assessment of progressive motivational patterns.



Concerning the overall results of the survey, the data suggest that emphasis on training and readiness in the traditional sense is not necessarily related to esprit and morale. The demands imposed for a constantly ready Marine Corps are well documented. However, these findings offer some support to a distinction which can be made between combat readiness, using traditional standards of training goals accomplished, and combat effectiveness in terms of the desire of troops to function as a cohesive unit, with confidence in the hierarchy of command, and dedicated toward their mission. The point was dramatically made by several U.S. units during the war in Vietnam: combat ready U.S. troops refused to board carriers to confront a noncombat ready (by U.S. standards) enemy.

While intensive training efforts may be justified in order to maintain a precision force, the question for modern leaders to ponder is: at what point in the schedule are training returns diminished or is effectiveness reduced? Every athlete and coach understands the concept of overtraining. Like many situations involving intensive achievement efforts, more may mean less.

Predictive performance validity is the most important aspect of any instrument which purports to measure a mental state of readiness. It has been demonstrated that properly measured perceptions can predict a behavioral outcome. The evidence presented in this report establishes the LEAP Interaction Inventory as a valid predictor of absenteeism and reenlistment rates. These criteria are fundamental to the maintenance of an effective defense force. The additional burden imposed by absenteeism is directly reflected in terms of man hours lost through apprehension and confinement, disciplinary action, and non-EAS discharge. And, unnecessary loss of trained and experienced manpower has a high impact on the quality of leadership throughout the Corps.

Beyond assessment of instrument validity, evidence was presented showing that the environmental context or unit composition can affect both motivation and leadership performance. The mixture of personalities and cultures occurring by chance, which influences group harmony or generates conflict, naturally transcends the commander's responsibility. As a result, judgments of leadership must be tempered by a firm understanding of those external conditions which dictate events. However, while such conditions must be accounted for, a wide variation was found with regard to the ability of some leaders to control these events. Therefore, environmental conditions must not be considered absolute barriers to change: they are merely leadership challenges to be conquered.

The results of this study should be highly informative for leaders at all levels of command. Concerning several important

leadership topics, it was possible to define what some of the problems are, where critical issues are to be found, and with whom various leadership conditions are most associated. Why some conditions exist and when certain events will most likely occur was also covered. The principal objective of the LEAP, however, is to discover how to control and influence leadership conditions in a manner which produces a more ready and effective Marine Corps.

Locating and understanding the causes of these leadership conditions is half the battle. The next step is to encourage leaders to assemble basic command data, take corrective action, evaluate outcomes, and exchange results.

There is a great need to know more about the effects of unit composition, size, location, and mission requirements. Future manpower assignment models may include motivational/demographic data to produce the most ideal distribution of personnel. Moreover, training programs can be evaluated at the small unit level, and schedules can be adjusted to produce the best combination of topics in consideration of the diversity and motivational needs of a command. And, intervention programs may be planned to prevent the occurrence of negative outcomes and to reinforce positive trends based on the actual conditions of individual commands.

Beyond determining the impact of external forces on leadership conditions, there is a need to document the internal actions which are effective in maintaining and optimal performance level. Practical leadership decisions need to be systematically assessed through valid procedures and results communicated in the most expeditious manner to all who can benefit from the success of others. Decision-making feedback is the key to a solution oriented program.

There are thousands of possible data permutations with the perceptual items of the Interaction Inventory alone. Combined with the variety of command performance measures available, the information processing possibilities are enormous. Adjuncts to the present questionnaire focusing on unique leadership aspects will generate additional information of a more definitive nature. And, future application of multiple regression analyses procedures will enable leaders to account for a number of leadership variables, and thereby provide more accurate predictions of combat readiness/effectiveness.

As a self-development leadership program, the strategy for LEAP implementation is to permit complete autonomy of application by the commands for which the program was designed, viz., company, battery, and squadron level. A program which produces direct dividends to individual commanders for their time and effort need not be mandatory. The primary mission of the LEAP, therefore, is to provide small unit leaders with the techniques for self-evaluation and to make available on-base systems support for unit analysis.

The secondary mission of the LEAP is to produce unit results for collective analysis as presented in this report. Therefore, a system had to be designed which would allow voluntary participation for combined analysis while maintaining unit confidentiality.

The Network Monitor System (NMS) is presently planned to function as an information storage and retrieval data bank for cross-communication between commands on an anonymous and voluntary basis. Data can be recorded in the form of results obtained and solutions discovered by unit commanders. The output will be given in terms of decision probability for direct inquiries by a commander who outlines unit leadership problems encountered. In addition, collective results can be provided through periodic reports.

Through the NMS an historical record of cause and effect will be maintained, and unit commanders will have a common source of reference to share solutions to common leadership problems. The system can also be used as a training model at formal schools to give Marine officers an opportunity to respond to actual personnel situations and to receive decision-making feedback prior to command assignment.

The rationale for the use of the LEAP in the Marine Corps is based on the assumption that leadership is both a science and an art. The art of leadership involves the acknowledgment and application of leadership principles which are scientifically determined.



## CONCLUSION

The LEAP is a pioneer organizational development program which functions as a leadership/management aid for the small unit commander. As a decentralized, self-applied approach, the LEAP provides commanders with a quick reaction capability for identifying and controlling critical unit performance and motivational conditions. Since the program is designed for complete control by the unit commander, the need for professional intervention is eliminated, and command confidentiality is maintained. Moreover, the program is much more efficient and considerably less expensive than the usual centralized OD methods.

A strong foundation for acceptance and implementation has been established through field testing, data analyses, and application of standard validation procedures. The collective results of program application contained in this report indicate that the LEAP is a viable method which may have a significant impact on the future management of personnel in the Marine Corps.

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APPENDIX A

SAMPLE COMMENTS BY MARINES  
TO LEADERSHIP ISSUES



SAMPLE COMMENTS BY MARINES  
TO LEADERSHIP ISSUES

The items in the Interaction Inventory stimulated many of the Marines to expand on or qualify their response choice and to make additional comments about conditions in their unit. Marines were encouraged to record such statements on the reverse side of the Answer Form. Commanders use these statements as an aid in interpreting the questionnaire data and to identify additional areas of concern.

The nature as well as the tone of the comments reflects the seriousness and candor with which unit personnel responded to the survey. In addition, these comments indicate the diversity of concern associated with each command and, in some cases, may highlight the most vital unit issues. Some groups emphasized concern over ethnic tension while others remarked about the inappropriateness of the ethnic question for their unit and, at the same time, expressed concern over training, educational opportunity, duty assignments, discipline, job satisfaction, etc.

Listed below is a sample of the statements made by the Marines. The comments are reproduced verbatim and, with the exception of a few corrections for punctuation, no editing was made. Statements with item numbers listed in parentheses refer to that item statement in the Interaction Inventory as recorded by the Marine.

Educational Development

Lack of opportunity for educational development due to duty commitments was a primary concern for some commands. Illustrative comments are:

Every time I try to further my education, someone higher says we have too much work.

(Item 11) I have been in this command for two and a half years and have seen many Marines enroll in off-duty education, but when it comes time for RIC inspections, field exercise and CG, IG inspections, they have to disenroll.

(Item 11) Security for each squad bay gives each man duty about once a week. Also DNCO/ADNCO takes

people. We go to the field often and have too many other commitments to allow a man to enroll in school.

I have off-duty school and can't get off. Why?

(Item 11) Command is only concerned with military education, such as MCI courses; not enough emphasis directed toward civilian-oriented studies, e.g., math, language, other college courses.

(Item 11) CO encourages education, but there is no guarantee we will be able to attend scheduled classes.

(Item 11, Educational Opportunity) Restricted to MCI which is almost useless in civilian world.

(Item 11) MCI, yes, for promotion because of operation commitments, off-duty classes, no.

Trying to get college courses is hard, because of varying times when we get off. There is no way to get off at a set time.

#### Justice and Discipline

The application of justice and discipline was another very prominent concern of Marines in many of the commands. The theme of these comments seems to focus on differential treatment not associated with any ethnic, rank, or career category, but rather indicating a possible conceptual difference between unit personnel and the CO in matters concerning justice.

(Item 51) Nothing to do with race or type of group, but I've seen people go up for office hours for the same thing, and the good Marine gets it light and the not so good Marine gets it rough. There is a little favoritism towards the good Marine, naturally, but the whole purpose of discipline is shot to hell when something like this happens.

(Item 40) The company is forced by the rules and regulations of the Marine Corps to administer punishment according to the crime, not the person.

(Item 36) Some people do wrong and are punished more than people who have done the same thing.

(Item 51) Same punishment for the same crime or rule breaking. No matter what the reason you or I would have.

(Item 45) Some people are punished more severely for the same offense than others.

Justice may be administered by the CO in consideration of the individual merits of a case. But unit personnel, being more concrete about the function of justice, may consider equal punishment for an equal offense a necessary condition. Publication of standards for disciplinary action or an explanation of how justice is administered may improve personnel perceptions in this regard.

#### Promotion Standards

Standards of promotion were another major concern of Marines in the sample. Some felt promotion should be based on ability to accomplish an assigned task, while others believed a Marine's appearance and military attitude should be an important consideration for advancement.

(Item 42) Marine's appearance should also be taken into consideration and intelligence. Too many NCO's in the company don't have the intelligence to rate the rank.

(Item 42) Promotions are based on what the leader thinks of a man, not by his ability.

(Item 42) It seems the Marines in this company, even in this battalion get promoted when they have T.I.G. whether they are qualified or not.

(Item 42) You get promoted on who you know, not what you know.

(Item 42) Here promotions come from military appearance instead of the job you do.

(Item 42) Promotions aren't based on ability alone. They're based on that plus past record. However, once a man has paved for his mistake, forget it. Don't keep punishing him.

(Item 42) A lot of people get promoted because they're always around here, but they never do any work.



(Item 42) A person's promotion is based on many things, but the most important--his ability to lead troops.

(Item 42) Promotions, I feel, are based more on what comes down from REGT, DIV, HQMC, etc., not on individual's ability at his MOS. MC gives rank away.

(Item 42) Promotions are not based on an individual's ability in this command.

#### Unit Praise

Marines also took the opportunity to praise their units.

(Item 14) Working in the office, I see men coming in with problems all day, nowhere have I seen problems solved so quickly.

(Item 25) Marines in this command are proud of it to others. But among ourselves we complain and say how bad it is. But will fight for it.

I think this command is good because it leaves a lot of responsibility to the individual, such as PT and clean-up and getting to formation on time.

Personal interest shown by SNCO's and officers towards troops is top notch (\_\_\_plt).

#### Ethnic Relations

The perceived lack or intensity of ethnic/racial tension in a command was also illustrated by the trend of comments.

Black Americans are harder on white Americans, and the first time a white American says anything about it, they say he is prejudiced.

(Item 41) It seems to me that Majority personnel are also forced to go out of their way to make Minority groups feel important. I think this command does not go by the saying, "All Marines are green and treated as such."

(Item 44) Never heard a complaint about discrimination.

(Item 60) Prejudice is and will be shown by some of the whites.

(Item 31) There aren't many (Complaints about prejudice and discrimination) in this unit, but there are some.

I do feel there is a certain amount of favoritism shown to blacks; not because of any outright prejudice, but out of fear of racial prejudice being accused of the commands throughout the Corps.

A lot of white officers keep white troopers over the Minority, mostly black troops.

Here at \_\_\_\_\_ I think the racial problem is very low. I have been here two years. I feel good to say that not once has any white Marine ever showed a racial act towards me.

Race relations in \_\_\_\_\_ are at a peak, they can either go good or bad. It is my opinion that it lays in the higher echelon of rank to stop trouble before it starts.

(Item 31) A lot of complaints (about prejudice and discrimination) are made, but in my opinion many are made unjustly.

(Item 31) There is a whole lot of prejudice and discrimination in this command.

(Item 49, In this command minority troops get away with breaking rules others are punished for.) Very, very strongly agree.

#### Ethnic/Rank Composition

Many comments regarding racial/ethnic tension referred to what has been termed reverse discrimination or Majority discrimination. This condition has also been emerging in other military services according to reports over the past several years. Such perceived reverse discrimination in one command could be an artifact of rank composition.

Too many Black NCO's.

...There is a lot of tension between minority and majority in the troops. The problem is minority NCO's and majority troops.

(My) Answers are based on the fact that most NCO's in the command are black.

#### Information Processing

Issues involving information dissemination were another main source for comment in some commands.

(Item 13) The troops are not told nothing until the last minute and it ruins their plans and makes them unhappy, that's why Marines go UA.

(Item 18) The word needs to get to the troops in a better way.

(Item 13) The troops are informed but not enough.

(Item 13) In this command you are given the word one minute and about an hour later it has changed.

Troops get along basically well, but lack up-to-date info, and are often confused.

#### Job Satisfaction

While job satisfaction in the military is a function of a number of conditions, such as quarters, justice, promotion standards, and location, as well as task or MOS fulfillment, some Marines did comment on their particular jobs.

(Item 8, Career intention) Maybe the answer would be yes if I could get a chance to get in the MOS I like instead of the one the Marine Corps wants.

Marines should be allowed extra schools to widen their knowledge of their own MOS.

(Item 12) Troops are dissatisfied with their jobs. They think too much of their time is taken up on small minor jobs.

...A Marine should have a better opportunity to do a job he truly desires.

Item 12) There seems to be a waste of talent in this command as throughout the Marine Corps. People are sent to schools by the military costing thousands of tax dollars and they're stuck in a totally unrelated job.



(Item 12) Myself and other similar people were dissatisfied when put on a job completely unrelated to what we were trained for and that we have little or no interest in. That's one of the reasons why I'm getting out. No guarantee whatsoever, without a hassle, of being able to do what kind of work or job you wish to.

Too many obstacles thrown at us to get our regular job done efficiently.

#### Summary

These comments may not be representative of the most critical issues produced by the survey or by any particular unit. They represent a sample of the concerns of those who took the time to record additional comments. The results of the entire survey will provide CO's with a more accurate motivational profile of their comments. In this way even the less articulate members of a unit have an equal voice in the collective response to the commander. As one Marine explained:

...A lower ranking person cannot talk to a Lt, Capt, Maj, etc., and get his or her point across. That is, trying to talk with respect for the officer's rank. He or she is too afraid to speak. Because they might say something that the officer doesn't like (sic).

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APPENDIX B

RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY COUNTS  
FOR TOTAL COMMAND, RANK GROUPS, AND  
RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUPS

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RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

ALL RESPONSES

COMMAND FREQUENCIES SCALE

COMMAND COHESION

COMMAND EFFICIENCY

ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SU	ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SO
1	6.2	23.2	15.9	32.8	21.8	11	8.2	34.3	26.3	21.4	9.9
13	18.7	30.8	27.1	19.8	11.4	16	7.0	23.1	25.6	28.4	15.7
15	7.5	18.5	21.8	26.9	23.1	19	11.5	20.5	25.8	22.1	20.1
25	9.2	20.9	30.4	21.6	17.8	22	4.2	17.1	22.5	35.8	20.4
28	5.8	21.7	25.1	20.1	22.2	24	7.0	23.2	28.4	25.3	16.1
32	15.9	28.2	25.0	24.0	5.9	26	5.9	25.2	27.5	25.6	15.9
38	19.3	31.1	17.7	24.2	7.5	29	8.2	29.0	25.0	22.2	15.6
43	8.8	13.1	20.6	33.1	24.2	34	14.3	19.9	22.9	30.3	12.5
47	21.7	21.4	26.2	21.7	9.1	37	13.6	20.1	20.8	32.0	13.5
52	17.2	27.2	22.6	23.3	9.4	40	7.2	18.3	18.5	32.9	23.1



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## RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

### A. ALL RESPONSES

#### COMMAND EQUALITY SCALE

##### MINORITY DISCRIMINATION

##### INTERGROUP CLIMATE

Item	SA	A	N	D	SU	ITEM	SA	A	B	D	SD
-34	6.1	7.5	17.1	36.6	32.6	33	12.2	31.8	24.6	17.1	14.2
-41	7.6	10.6	21.4	35.6	24.8	38	10.7	30.1	27.2	15.0	9.1
-43	8.1	8.5	20.8	35.5	27.2	-31	17.0	15.6	21.8	27.2	18.3
-46	6.8	8.5	18.5	40.3	25.0	-50	11.3	15.9	26.3	32.6	13.8

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RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

A. ALL RESPONSES

MAJORITY DISCRIMINATION

JUSTICE

ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SD	ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SD
35	9.0	29.3	15.0	21.4	23.8	-32	11.8	12.4	26.5	29.5	20.5
36	11.2	29.7	24.6	16.9	17.6	-37	4.5	9.6	22.2	40.4	23.1
41	17.9	36.8	24.3	10.5	10.7	-48	3.9	9.8	27.1	40.2	19.0
42	13.3	33.1	20.1	15.0	18.0	-49	10.1	14.6	21.1	31.5	20.7
44	5.1	27.2	49.2	10.6	7.9						
45	12.0	30.2	22.1	20.3	15.4						
47	12.1	39.6	20.2	17.1	11.0						
51	12.1	40.6	22.1	14.4	10.9						

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RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

X. ALL RESPONSES

EXPERIMENTAL SCALE

ETHNIC ALLIANCE

ITEM	SA	A	A	D	SD
39	20.4	30.9	21.1	20.4	7.2
52	23.0	33.3	20.8	16.1	6.9



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RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

X. ALL RESPONSES

GENERAL ATTITUDES

ETHNIC PRIDE

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

ITEM	SA	A	N	O	30	ITEM	SA	A	N	O	SC
56	35.8	46.2	12.9	3.1	2.0	53	5.1	27.1	17.9	19.3	30.6
59	11.1	34.6	32.5	13.5	8.2	57	31.0	31.2	24.0	9.0	4.8
61	11.6	28.1	26.2	20.9	13.2	60	17.1	21.9	21.5	24.0	13.1

ETHNIC AFFILIATION

ITEM	SA	A	N	J	30
54	11.2	30.7	23.2	23.3	11.5
55	7.3	24.2	23.2	30.6	14.7
58	8.7	23.5	24.9	28.3	14.6
62	10.7	33.1	37.7	10.4	8.1

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ANSWER FREQUENCIES

X. ALL RESPONSES

COMBAND PRELARGNESS SCALE

COMBAND EFFICILNLY

COMBAND COHESION

ITEM	JA	A	N	O	SO	ITEM	SA	A	N	O	SO
13	70	262	179	370	246	11	92	386	296	241	112
15	121	347	308	223	128	16	79	263	288	320	177
21	84	209	258	303	263	13	130	231	291	249	226
25	104	216	343	243	201	22	47	193	254	503	230
28	96	214	285	294	250	24	79	262	320	285	181
-12	131	318	282	270	66	26	67	284	310	288	178
-18	218	351	200	273	85	29	92	327	282	250	176
-20	94	148	214	373	273	-14	161	224	258	342	142
-23	244	241	255	244	103	-17	154	227	234	361	152
-27	117	306	255	253	106	-34	81	206	209	371	260

ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

X. ALL RESPONSES

COMMAND EQUALITY SCALE

MINORITY DISCRIMINATION

INTERGROUP CLIMATE

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SO	ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SC
-34	69	05	193	413	367	33	137	358	279	193	100
-41	86	113	241	401	280	38	121	429	306	169	102
-43	91	96	234	400	306	-31	192	176	246	307	206
-46	77	96	209	454	291	-50	127	179	296	370	155

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ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

ALL RESPONSES

MAJORITY DISCRIMINATION

JUSTICE

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD	ITER	SA	A	N	D	SD
32	161	337	180	251	258	-32	124	140	299	313	231
36	126	335	277	131	198	-37	51	108	250	455	263
40	202	412	274	118	121	-43	44	111	305	453	214
42	135	371	227	169	203	-49	114	164	218	378	233
44	34	306	555	119	89						
46	135	341	249	229	174						
47	136	456	228	133	124						
51	136	457	249	162	123						

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
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# RESULTS FREQUENCIES

## X. ALL RESPONSES

### EXPERIMENTAL SCALE

### ETHNIC ALLIANCE

ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SU
39	230	348	238	230	81
52	259	375	234	181	78

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RESULTS FREQUENCIES

A. ALL RESPONSES

GENERAL ATTITUDES

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

ETHNIC PRIDE

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD	ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD
56	603	521	145	35	24	51	58	305	202	217	345
59	127	330	466	152	92	57	349	352	271	101	54
61	131	317	295	235	149	60	195	269	242	271	150

ETHNIC AFFILIATION

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD
54	126	346	262	263	130
55	82	273	261	345	166
58	98	265	201	319	164
62	121	373	425	117	91

# RELATIVE PRIORITIES

X. RANK 5 AND BELOW  
Y. RANK 6 AND ABOVE

## COMMAND EFFICIENCY SCALE

COMMAND EFFICIENCY

COMMAND COMMISSION

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD	ITEM	SA	A	M	D	SD
13	6.0	22.7	15.6	43.2	22.5	11	7.7	31.4	26.1	22.3	10.6
	9.3	30.2	20.9	26.7	12.8		16.0	46.5	27.9	9.3	2.3
15	10.9	30.5	27.3	13.6	11.7	16	6.8	22.1	25.9	29.1	16.8
	9.3	36.0	25.6	23.3	5.0		19.5	37.2	19.0	22.1	10.5
21	7.3	17.3	23.4	27.1	24.3	19	10.7	19.3	25.8	22.8	21.5
	9.3	25.6	33.2	24.4	10.5		23.3	33.7	25.6	15.1	2.3
25	9.3	19.3	30.2	22.1	16.5	22	4.4	15.6	21.1	37.1	20.8
	9.3	32.6	32.6	17.4	8.1		2.3	22.1	38.4	22.1	15.1
28	5.1	20.8	24.7	26.4	23.0	24	5.1	21.9	28.9	26.0	17.2
	5.5	32.6	27.9	24.4	11.6		17.4	40.7	20.9	17.4	3.5
-12	17.7	29.3	25.2	22.4	5.4	26	5.6	24.1	27.8	26.3	17.0
	7.0	15.1	24.4	41.9	11.6		18.5	38.4	33.7	15.1	2.3
-18	20.3	30.3	18.4	23.4	7.0	29	0.0	28.0	25.0	22.7	16.3
	9.3	32.6	8.1	34.9	15.1		9.3	41.9	25.6	17.4	5.8
-25	3.8	12.8	20.9	33.0	24.4	-15	15.7	20.6	23.5	38.4	18.7
	5.8	18.0	18.6	34.9	22.1		8.1	12.8	15.1	27.9	36.0
-23	22.8	21.2	26.3	20.3	5.4	-17	15.1	20.6	20.5	31.4	13.3
	7.1	23.3	25.6	37.2	5.8		7.3	18.0	23.3	40.7	15.1
-27	18.6	27.4	22.7	22.2	9.1	-30	7.6	18.4	19.6	32.6	21.9
	3.5	24.4	22.1	33.4	11.6		2.3	16.3	4.7	19.5	37.2

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RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

X. RANK 15 AND BELOW  
Y. RANK 16 AND ABOVE

EXPERIMENTAL SCALE

ETHNIC ALLIANCE

ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SO
39	21.6	39.6	20.8	19.8	7.2
	4.7	33.7	24.4	23.1	8.1
52	24.3	33.5	18.5	16.5	7.2
	7.0	30.2	48.8	10.5	3.5

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RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

A. RANK 15 AND BELOW  
Y. RANK 16 AND ABOVE

GENERAL ATTITUDES

ETHNIC PRIDE

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SO	ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SO
56	36.6	45.1	13.0	3.2	2.1	53	5.2	26.6	18.4	18.3	31.4
	27.9	58.1	10.5	2.3	1.2		4.7	31.4	15.0	29.1	20.9
59	11.4	35.6	32.2	12.4	7.9	57	32.5	30.7	23.7	8.6	4.5
	9.3	20.9	37.2	20.9	11.6		15.1	36.0	30.2	11.6	7.0
61	12.4	28.9	25.3	20.2	13.3	60	18.4	24.5	21.0	23.4	12.7
	3.5	18.6	37.2	29.1	11.6		4.7	15.1	27.9	33.7	10.6

ETHNIC AFFILIATION

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SO
54	11.6	31.4	23.2	22.8	11.0
	3.8	20.9	25.8	29.1	13.6
55	7.8	25.1	23.8	29.7	13.5
	1.2	12.8	16.3	41.9	27.9
58	9.3	24.3	25.3	27.6	13.5
	2.1	14.0	20.5	37.2	25.6
62	10.6	32.8	37.4	13.5	8.6
	11.6	36.0	40.7	10.5	1.2

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## RESULTS FREQUENCIES

7. RANK 25 AND BELOW  
8. RANK 6 AND ABOVE

## COMMAND PREPAREDNESS SCALE

### COMMAND COHESION

### COMMAND EFFICIENCY

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD	ITL	SA	A	N	U	SC
13	62	234	161	343	242	11	79	345	269	230	109
14	8	26	16	23	11	12	12	40	24	8	2
15	112	315	282	202	121	16	70	230	267	300	165
16	8	31	22	20	5	9	9	32	17	19	9
21	75	185	241	200	251	19	110	199	266	235	222
22	8	22	26	21	9	20	20	29	22	13	2
25	30	205	312	228	191	22	45	171	218	383	215
26	8	20	28	15	7	2	2	19	33	19	13
28	51	215	225	272	237	24	61	226	298	258	177
29	3	28	24	21	10	15	15	35	18	15	3
-12	181	302	260	231	26	26	58	249	279	271	175
30	6	13	21	36	10	9	9	33	29	13	2
-18	209	319	190	242	72	24	83	289	250	234	168
31	8	25	7	30	13	8	8	36	22	15	5
-20	91	132	216	311	252	-13	152	213	243	314	110
32	5	15	16	30	19	7	7	11	13	24	31
-21	235	219	271	210	97	-17	146	213	212	324	137
33	7	20	22	32	5	6	6	12	20	35	13
-27	192	201	244	243	94	-30	73	190	202	336	226
34	3	21	19	33	10	2	2	14	4	34	32



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ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

X. RANK 15 AND BELOW  
Y. RANK 16 AND ABOVE

GENERAL ATTITUDES

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

ETHNIC PRIDE

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD	ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD
56	378	463	134	34	22	53	54	275	190	189	324
24	50	9	2	1	1	4	27	12	25	10	10
59	118	307	332	133	82	57	335	317	245	89	46
8	18	32	18	10	10	13	31	26	10	6	6
61	128	230	261	208	137	61	190	253	217	241	131
3	16	32	25	10	10	4	13	24	29	16	16

ETHNIC AFFILIATION

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD
54	120	324	239	235	119
5	18	22	25	16	16
55	81	259	246	307	139
1	11	14	36	24	24
58	96	251	261	285	139
2	12	18	32	22	22
62	109	333	386	108	69
10	31	35	9	1	1

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ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

X. RANK 15 AND BELOW  
Y. RANK 16 AND ABOVE

EXPERIMENTAL SCALE

ETHNIC ALLIANCE

ILR	SA	A	N	D	SU
39	223	316	215	204	74
	4	29	21	25	7
52	251	346	191	170	74
	6	25	42	9	3

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RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

X. ETHNIC MINORITY  
Y. ETHNIC MAJORITY

JUSTICE

MAJORITY DISCRIMINATION

ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SU	IFM	SA	A	N	O	SO
35	8.7	25.4	17.3	22.9	25.7	-32	9.9	7.9	22.4	28.0	31.8
	9.1	32.3	15.3	20.6	22.8		11.6	14.9	28.7	30.4	18.4
36	9.2	23.7	25.2	13.8	22.4	-37	4.6	7.9	16.0	15.4	16.1
	12.3	31.0	24.3	15.5	15.0		4.5	10.5	25.5	43.1	16.5
40	15.0	29.0	26.5	11.5	18.1	-48	5.3	12.0	26.5	35.4	20.9
	19.5	40.6	23.2	9.9	6.8		3.1	8.7	27.4	42.8	18.0
42	11.5	32.6	24.9	12.0	20.1	-49	6.9	7.4	19.8	34.1	31.8
	15.0	33.4	18.1	16.6	16.9		11.9	18.4	21.8	33.2	14.7
44	3.1	20.9	47.3	14.5	14.2						
	6.3	30.5	50.3	8.4	4.5						
45	8.1	23.2	25.7	21.4	21.6						
	14.0	33.9	20.2	19.8	12.1						
47	8.4	31.6	22.4	22.4	15.3						
	14.0	43.9	19.1	14.3	8.7						
51	10.2	33.1	25.2	15.0	16.5						
	13.1	44.6	20.4	14.0	7.9						

RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

X. ETHNIC PRIORITY  
Y. ETHNIC MAJORITY

EXPERIMENTAL SCALE

ETHNIC ALLIANCE

ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SD
39	21.4	27.2	21.6	21.6	8.1
	19.9	32.8	28.8	19.8	6.7
52	21.9	30.3	21.4	16.5	9.9
	21.6	34.9	28.4	15.8	5.1

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RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

X. ETHNIC MINORITY  
Y. ETHNIC MAJORITY

GENERAL ATTITUDES

ETHNIC PRIDE

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

ITEM	SA	A	N	U	SD	ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SC
56	46.6	39.2	5.4	2.0	2.8	51	6.1	31.1	19.6	16.0	27.0
	30.0	50.0	14.7	3.7	1.6		4.6	24.8	17.0	21.0	32.6
59	19.8	36.1	27.2	9.2	7.6	57	25.2	31.8	27.5	10.4	5.1
	6.7	33.8	35.3	15.8	8.4		34.1	30.9	22.2	8.2	4.6
61	5.9	21.9	16.8	21.9	29.5	60	24.4	27.2	21.6	16.0	10.7
	14.7	30.4	31.2	19.2	4.5		13.5	22.1	21.4	20.3	14.7

ETHNIC AFFILIATION

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD
54	14.2	31.0	23.9	17.6	12.5
	9.5	30.1	22.9	26.4	11.0
55	9.7	22.4	22.1	29.0	16.8
	6.0	25.2	23.7	31.5	13.6
58	8.4	28.0	23.9	24.2	15.5
	4.9	21.1	25.5	30.5	14.0
62	10.9	34.4	33.3	12.2	9.2
	10.6	32.4	40.1	9.4	7.5



ABSOLUTE FAULTS

N. ETHNIC PRIORITY  
Y. ETHNIC MAJORITY

COMMAND EQUALITY SCALE

MINORITY DISCRIMINATION

INTERGROUP CLIMATE

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SU	ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SU
-34	47	55	68	124	79	33	62	106	87	59	79
	22	30	105	289	288		75	252	192	134	81
-41	57	51	114	100	61	40	39	130	104	65	55
	29	58	127	401	219		82	299	202	104	47
-43	72	56	107	102	56	-31	93	80	83	80	57
	19	40	127	298	250		99	96	163	227	149
-46	51	64	106	120	52	-50	57	71	99	116	50
	26	32	103	334	239		79	104	197	254	105

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ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

X. ETHNIC MINORITY  
Y. ETHNIC MAJORITY

MAJORITY DISCRIMINATION

JUSTICE

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SO	ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SO
35	34	100	68	90	101	-32	35	31	88	118	125
	67	237	112	151	167		65	109	211	223	186
36	36	93	99	77	88	-37	18	31	53	139	142
	90	242	178	114	110		33	77	187	316	121
40	59	114	104	45	71	-48	21	47	104	139	82
	143	248	170	73	50		23	64	201	314	132
42	45	128	94	47	79	-49	27	29	78	134	125
	110	245	133	122	124		87	135	168	244	108
44	12	82	186	57	56						
	46	224	369	62	33						
45	32	91	101	84	85						
	103	249	148	145	89						
47	33	124	88	88	60						
	103	322	140	105	64						
51	40	130	99	59	55						
	96	327	156	103	58						

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ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

X. ETHNIC MINORITY  
Y. ETHNIC MAJORITY

GENERAL ATTITUDES

ETHNIC PRIDE

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

ITEM	SA	A	N	O	SU	ITCM	SA	A	N	O	SD
56	101	154	37	8	11	53	24	123	77	63	106
	220	307	102	27	12		34	182	125	154	239
59	78	142	107	36	30	57	99	125	100	41	20
	49	248	259	116	62		250	227	163	66	34
61	23	94	86	34	116	60	96	102	85	63	42
	108	223	229	141	33		99	162	157	200	108

ETHNIC AFFILIATION

ITEM	SA	A	N	O	SU
54	56	123	94	09	49
	70	221	168	134	81
55	30	80	87	114	66
	54	185	174	231	100
58	13	110	94	95	61
	65	155	187	224	163
62	43	135	131	48	36
	78	230	244	69	55



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ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES

X. ETHNIC PRIORITY  
Y. ETHNIC MAJORITY  
EXPERIMENTAL SCALE

ETHNIC ALLIANCE

ITEM	SA	A	N	D	SD
39	84	107	85	85	32
	196	251	153	145	49
52	86	119	84	65	39
	173	256	150	116	39

APPENDIX C

SAMPLE POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

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Table 1c

Total Sample Profile

N = 1127

Category	Percent	Category	Percent
a. Rank:		d. Education:	
Officer	1.5	8th or less	2.1
Enlisted	98.5	9th to 11th	30.1
E-1/2	28.0	High School	59.7
E-3/4	50.1	College	8.1
E-5	13.4	e. Time in Corps:	
E-6/9	6.2	0-1 yr	18.3
b. No Response	.8	1-2 yrs	27.3
c. Ethnic Group:		2-3 yrs	21.3
Majority	65.5	3-4 yrs	18.2
Minority	34.5	4-6 yrs	5.6
Black	22.1	6-10 yrs	5.9
Other	12.4	10-15 yrs	1.5
		15+ yrs	2.0



Table 2c

## Rank and Racial/Ethnic Group

Rank	Groups								
	White			Black			Other		Total
	N	Col.	Percent	N	Col.	Percent	N	Col.	Percent
			Row			Row		Row	Row
E-1/2	189	(26.0)	60.2	82	(33.5)	26.1	43	(30.9)	13.7
E-3/4	371	(51.0)	66.0	120	(49.0)	21.4	71	(51.1)	12.6
E-5	105	(14.4)	70.0	28	(11.4)	18.7	17	(12.2)	11.3
E-6/7	41	( 5.6)	71.9	12	( 4.9)	21.1	4	( 2.9)	7.0
E-8/9	8	( 1.1)	66.7	1	( 0.4)	8.3	3	( 2.2)	25.0
WO	0	( 0.0)	0.0	1	( 0.4)	100.0	0	( 0.0)	0.0
02/1	12	( 1.6)	85.7	1	( 0.4)	7.1	1	( 1.7)	7.1
03	2	( 0.3)	100.0	0	( 0.0)	0.0	0	( 0.0)	0.0
Total	728	65.5		245	22.1		139	12.4	
									100.0

Table 3c  
Rank and Educational Level

Rank	Grade Level			
	0-8th	9th-11th	High School	College
E-1/2	9 (2.8%)	124 (39.2%)	170 (53.8%)	13 (4.1%)
E-3/4	10 (1.8%)	172 (30.4%)	339 (60.0%)	44 (7.8%)
E-5	2 (1.3%)	29 (19.2%)	107 (70.9%)	13 (8.6%)
E-6/7	1 (1.8%)	10 (17.5%)	43 (75.4%)	3 (5.3%)
E-8/9	0 (0.0%)	2 (16.7%)	9 (75.0%)	1 (8.3%)
WO	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)
1/2 Lt.	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	14 (100.0%)
Capt./Maj.	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (100.0%)

Table 4c  
Racial/Ethnic Group and Educational Level

Grade Level	Racial/Ethnic Group			
	White	Black	Other	Total
8th or less	14 ( 1.9%)	6 ( 2.4%)	3 ( 2.2%)	23 ( 2.1%)
9th to 11th	202 (27.6%)	75 (30.5%)	59 (42.4%)	336 (30.1%)
High School	448 (61.3%)	149 (60.6%)	69 (49.6%)	666 (59.7%)
College	67 ( 9.2%)	16 ( 6.5%)	8 ( 5.8%)	91 ( 8.2%)



Table 5c  
Raw Score Mean, Standard Deviation, and t Values  
for LEAP Scale Scores for Two Periods

LEAP Scales	1976 (N = 297)		1977 (N = 1127)		t value
	Raw Score Mean	Std. Deviation	Raw Score Mean	Std. Deviation	
Command Preparedness	42.46	13.78	46.30	14.45	4.23***
Command Efficiency	21.79	7.80	23.93	8.03	4.18***
Command Cohesion	20.67	6.92	22.37	7.81	3.68***
Command Equality	33.95	13.50	36.21	12.05	2.62**
Minority Discrimination	5.25	3.73	5.59	3.61	1.40
Majority Discrimination	5.96	3.55	6.29	3.38	1.44
Intergroup Climate	7.29	3.89	8.02	3.45	2.93**
Justice	15.46	6.77	16.32	6.96	1.97*
Motivational LQ	76.41	27.28	82.52	26.56	3.45**
<hr/>					
* p .05	** p .01	*** p .001			

Table 6c  
Command Preparedness Score Range

LEAP Scales	Scores		
	High	Mean	Low
Command Preparedness	77.1	49.2	34.9
Command Efficiency	78.8	50.5	39.6
Command Cohesion	75.4	47.9	30.2

Table 7c  
Command Equality Score Range

LEAP Scales	Scores		
	High	Mean	Low
Command Equality	76.6	59.5	50.3
Minority Discrimination	75.5	67.7	45.5
Majority Discrimination	80.8	64.8	43.4
Intergroup Climate	80.5	55.5	54.7
Justice	73.2	54.8	62.3

Table 8c

Rank and Command Preparedness Scale Scores

Rank	LEAP Scales		
	Comd. Prep.	Comd. Eff.	Comd. Cohes.
E-1/2	52.4	52.3	52.5
E-3/4	42.9	41.4	44.5
E-5	43.6	40.9	46.4
E-6/9	55.0	51.4	58.6
O	67.6	64.9	70.3



Table 9c

Command Preparedness Scores  
for Two Rank Groups

LEAP Scales	Rank	
	E-5 & Below	E-6 & Above
Command Preparedness	48.4	59.2
Command Efficiency	47.4	55.2
Command Cohesion	49.5	63.1

Table 10c

Command Equality Scores  
for Two Racial/Ethnic Groups

LEAP Scales	Groups	
	Majority	Minority
Command Equality	62.5	54.2
Minority Discrimination	74.7	55.1
Majority Discrimination	62.6	69.2
Intergroup Climate	58.2	50.7
Justice	58.6	48.1

Table 11c

Command Equality Scores  
for Three Racial/Ethnic Groups

LEAP Scales	Groups		
	White	Black	Other
Command Equality	62.5	55.4	52.2
Minority Discrimination	74.7	49.9	61.2
Majority Discrimination	62.6	70.1	63.8
Intergroup Climate	58.2	49.5	50.9
Justice	58.6	45.7	50.6

Table 12c

## Command Preparedness and Career Choice

LEAP Scales	Career Choice		
	Yes	Und.	No
Command Preparedness	53.9	50.7	43.1
Command Efficiency	51.6	49.7	41.5
Command Cohesion	56.1	51.7	44.6

Table 13c

## Command Equality and Career Choice

LEAP Scales	Career Choice		
	Yes	Und.	No
Command Equality	66.4	62.1	54.0
Minority Discrimination	74.3	70.8	63.8
Majority Discrimination	68.6	65.4	60.1
Intergroup Climate	61.0	59.2	50.4
Justice	64.1	57.5	48.0



Table 14c  
Command Motivation and Time in Corps

Years	LEAP Scales	
	Comd. Preparedness	Comd. Equality
0-1	63.1	58.1
1-2	55.9	44.4
2-3	54.4	41.8
3-4	54.9	41.3
4-6	61.7	46.6
6-10	65.4	51.6
10-15	70.5	59.9
15+	74.0	59.2

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